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In 2004, the World Bank (IDA) introduced the Debt Sustainability Framework 
(DSF) for low-income countries, so called “traffic light system”, based on which IDA 
determines the grant/loan ratio to be allocated to each recipient country for each fiscal 
year. For instance, the country receives 100% grant aid, if the country is classified as 
“red light” (i.e. unsustainable debt level), under the traffic light system. The World 
Bank and IMF have been requesting the other institutions (aid donors, export credit 
agencies and private lenders) to comply with this system, in order to maintain 
developing countries’ debt sustainability and to avoid another debt crisis. Since its 
introduction, there is a growing concern for some actual and potential shortcomings 
embedded in the system.  
My dissertation attempts to address three major issues among them in each 
essay with strong emphasis on policy implications. The first issue is the free rider 
problem. Some of the other institutions are suspected to be not complying with the 
system, and to have been providing non-concessional loans to the “red light” country, 
by abusing their debt carrying capacity which is improved by grant aid from IDA and 
other donors. The first chapter develops a theoretical model of the free rider problem, 
and tests empirically for free riding. The second chapter examines the traffic light 
system’s implicit assumption on the monotonic relationship between the debt stock 
and the default probability, and provides a theoretical model as well as empirical 
 evidence of non-monotonicity. Panel Logit/Probit analysis indicates that the 
relationship is “N-shaped” which implies that there exist a paradoxical zone in which 
default probability could decrease rather than increase with debt stock. The third 
chapter addresses the possibility that the traffic light system unduly constrains the 
ability of recipient countries to finance their development goals. The theoretical model 
and numerical simulations show what the sustainable debt level should be and how 
“red light” shock affects the long-run economic growth of the recipient country. 
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1 
CHAPTER 1 
SIGNALING EFFECT AND DYNAMIC BARGAINING 
UNDER THE WORLD BANK’S TRAFFIC LIGHT SYSTEM 
 
1. Introduction 
In 2004, the World Bank (IDA) introduced the debt sustainability framework 
(DSF) for low-income countries, so called “traffic light system”, based on which IDA 
determines the grant/loan ratio to be allocated to each recipient country for each fiscal 
year. For instance, the country receives 100% grant aid, if the country is classified as 
“red light” (i.e. its debt level is unsustainable), under the traffic light system. The 
World Bank and IMF have been requesting the other institutions (aid donors, export 
credit agencies and private lenders) to comply with this system, in order to maintain 
developing countries’ debt sustainability and to avoid another debt crises.  
Since its introduction, there is a growing concern for the free rider problem. 
Namely, some of the other institutions are not complying with the system, and might 
have been providing non-concessional loans to the “red light” country, by abusing 
their debt carrying capacity which is improved by grant aid from IDA and other 
donors. However, based on some political considerations to so-called “emerging 
donors” such as China, Brazil, and so forth, the responsibility to avoid non-
concessional loans was now shifted onto the borrower’s side1, which makes this 
problem’s essentials hushed up. One of the pioneering criticism on this issue is raised 
by Tan (2006). 
The main contribution of this paper is to provide both the theoretical 
framework and the empirical analysis on the free rider problem of the traffic light 
                                                 
1
 In 2006, IDA introduced the policy on non-concessional borrowing, based on which the non-
complying borrower country is penalized by either the hardened terms of assistance or the 
reduction of the assistance volume from IDA.  
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system. To the author’s knowledge, little studies, both in empirical and theoretical 
sense, have been conducted on the traffic light system so far. This paper examines how 
actually the traffic light system affects the behavior of the borrower countries/the 
donor agencies/the private lenders, and the international financial flow to developing 
countries.  
This paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the related 
literature and provides a motivation for the need for research on the signaling effect 
and the free rider issues of IDA’s traffic light system. The third section describes the 
theoretical model. The fourth section presents the empirical results through the 
econometric analysis. The last section provides some policy implications and way 
forward. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Although there are many studies on the effects of the international financial 
institutions (IFIs)’ involvement in the debt rescheduling negotiations among the 
private lenders and the borrower country, there have been a limited number of 
attempts to model the involvement of the bilateral official creditors. 
Bulow and Rogoff (1988) analyzed multilateral negotiations for rescheduling 
sovereign debt by using dynamic bargaining theoretic framework. The analysis 
illustrates how various factors such as debtor’s gain from trade and the level of world 
interest rate affect the relative bargaining power of three parties; debtor country, 
private lenders and creditor country. Bulow and Rogoff (1989) also presents a 
dynamic bargaining model of international lending, which extends to modeling the 
stochastic output and interest rate. Bulow et al. (1992) applied the Nash bargaining 
solution to the four-way rescheduling negotiations among the IFIs, the official 
bilateral creditors, the debtor country and the private banks, in the context of the aid to 
 3 
 
the former Soviet blocs in Europe. Diwan and Rodrik (1992) analyzed the model in 
which the IFIs’ comparative advantage is their capacity to enforce the borrower 
country to implement the conditionality for adjustment programs. This comparative 
advantage enhances the value of the three-way debt reduction agreement. Spiegel 
(1996) examines a concerted debt reduction deal between a sovereign debtor, a private 
creditor, and an official creditor, who is supposed to insure the deposits of the 
commercial bank. His model assumes the exogenous debtor nation, and shows that a 
weakening of the financial position of the commercial bank reduces the contribution 
of the commercial bank and increases that of the official creditor. Klimenko (2002) 
analyzed the effect of a debtor country’s pattern of trade with commercial creditors’ 
home countries on the outcome of debt-rescheduling negotiations, based on Bulow 
and Rogoff (1998) approach. The analysis reveals that a debtor country with more 
market power has greater leverage in a three-way debt-rescheduling negotiation that 
includes the debtor country, its creditors and the International Financial Institutions.  
The most of the past works on modeling the behavior of the official creditors 
and the private lenders focus on emerging economies, and there are a few studies on 
specifically devoted to the low income countries’ context. Mehta and Thapa (1991) 
develops the microeconomic model of the supply of bank credit to the least developed 
countries (LDCs) by integrating the notion of political bailout, in order to explain the 
lending behavior of the banks. Their model suggests that U.S. commercial banks have 
behaved responsibly in extending large loans at low interest rates to a small number of 
LDCs, if the banks perceived the U.S. government warranty for bailout in case of 
LDCs’ default. Their model actually captures the free riding behavior of the U.S. 
commercial banks that anticipate U.S. government’s bailout would constitute a 
warranty. 
Although some of these previous studies provide the foundations for the 
 4 
 
theoretical model to be examined in this paper, none of them provide the empirical 
analyses to examine how well their theoretical model represent the actual data. On the 
other hand, there are large volume of empirical studies, which sometimes lacks the 
rigorous theoretical model, on the international financial flow to the developing 
countries. Lee (1993) examines whether the credit ratings assigned by the lenders can 
be explained by a set of explanatory variables selected from the willingness of the 
LDCs to repay their debt service obligations. The results indicate that the credit ratings 
provide a reasonable measure of the borrowers’ creditworthiness and also that there is 
a geographical contagion in assigning credit ratings. Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 
(1994) compares the shares of official creditors in external debts of four Latin 
American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela) and four Asian 
countries (Indonesia, South Korea, the Philippines and Turkey) in 1973-1989, and 
found that the Asian countries paid considerably lower average interest rates on 
external debt because of official creditors low interest rates. Thus, the Asian countries 
obtained substantial subsides in the form of loans at below-market interest rates. Kim 
and Wu (2008) address how the sovereign credit ratings provided by independent 
ratings agencies affect international capital flow, based on dataset of sovereign credit 
ratings from Standard & Poor’s from 1995-2003 for a cross-section of 51 emerging 
markets. One of the findings is that the long-term foreign currency ratings positively 
correlate with international financial inflow. Improvement of the ratings attracts 
international financial inflow. Papaioannou (2009) examined how institutional quality 
of the developing countries affects international lending to them, by using a large 
panel of country-pair financial flow. The results suggest that poorly performing 
institutions, such as weak protection of property rights, are major impediments to 
foreign bank capital flow. Hayakawa, Kimura, and Lee (2011) examines the political 
and financial risk components that matter most for the activities of multinational 
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corporations in 93 countries including 60 developing countries. Their finding is that 
even though the political risk significantly affects the foreign direct investment 
decisions, the financial risk of the host country, except for the exchange rate stability, 
is not considered seriously.  
Thus, there are a few attempts to provide both the theoretical model the 
empirical analyses. Among them, Rose and Spiegel (2002) developed the theoretical 
model in which a sovereign debtor countries allocate its borrowing across different 
creditor nations, when default penalties are based on proportional losses in the 
bilateral gains from trade, then applied the gravity model to explain how the creditors 
systematically lend more to countries with which they share close trade links with 
empirical data. Bjornskov and Philipp (2010) explores a causal link between aid and 
debt repayment by modeling the loan agreement between the developing country 
government and the international financial sector as a negotiation of self-interested 
agents, where the presence of foreign aid affects the negotiation outcome. A set of 
panel estimates including 93 developing countries shows that foreign aid is strongly 
negatively associated with repayment incentives. Therefore, one of this paper’s aims is 
to bridge the theory and the empirics.  
 
3. Theoretical Model 
The theoretical model is constructed, based on the approach of Bulow and 
Rogoff (1988), and Klimenko (2002), which is applied to the three-way bargaining 
framework among (i)borrower country, (ii)bilateral donor country, and (iii)private 
lenders. Since their models were applied to the context of debt rescheduling 
negotiation for the borrower country which is in sovereign default crisis, it has slightly 
different background in problem setting. However, the basic framework shares 
applicable structures. The basic setup is as follows; 
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Figure 1-1: Three-way Bargaining Framework 
Step 0 Multilateral Donor determines the traffic light (“red”) of Borrower Country, 
and exit from game. (i.e. the multilateral aid donors are assumed to be 
exogenous.) 
Step1 Borrower Country threatens Private Lenders and Bilateral Donor Country, by 
insisting that Borrower Country would default if new money from Private 
Lenders and Bilateral Donor Country is not provided. 
Step 2 Private Lenders and Bilateral Donor Country threaten back Borrower Country, 
by insisting that they would resort to trade sanction on Borrower Country in 
case of default. (The trade sanction leads to the reduced export from 
Borrower Country.) 
Step 3 Three parties bargain over their share of the welfare gains from avoiding the 
default. 
Step 4 When the three parties agree on their share, Borrower Country exports its 
output and three parties receive their share. The same game continues in each 
period. 
For Step 3, the Bilateral Donor Country is assumed to make the first proposal. 
When all three parties are impatient to reach an agreement (i.e. have some 
sort of discount factor), there exists a unique stationary subgame perfect Nash 
Equilibrium. See Figure 1-1. 
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3.1. Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium 
Let    be the total welfare gains from avoiding default,     be the 
Borrower Country’s welfare gains, and     be the Bilateral Donor Country’s 
welfare gains:           . Private Lenders are not supposed to receive 
benefits from welfare gains directly. 
In order to find the equilibrium outcome, first step is to find each party’s 
value of the stationary strategy from the second stage of negotiation, where each party 
has equal probability to make a proposal. Since all the subgames after the second stage 
have same structure, the following system of equations should be satisfied: 
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where   
̂
,   
̂
,   
̂
 are the stationary value after the second stage under the 
unanimous agreement scheme, and   ,   ,    are the interest rate (assuming 
        ), and   ,   ,    are the subjective probability of default for the 
Borrower Country, and the Private Lenders, and the Donor Country respectively.  
Thus, each party’s discount factor has two components; the interest rate and 
the subjective probability of default. The latter is the key parameter, and is assumed to 
be a function of the traffic light. If the traffic light system delivers the “correct” signal, 
then the subjective probability of default would be higher as the light turns to be “red”. 
The system of equation (1) states that the proposer makes an offer so that the 
responders are indifferent between accepting the offer, the left-hand side, and rejecting 
it for a chance to make a counter-offer at the next period, the right-hand side. 
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By solving (1), which contains three unknowns and three equations, the 
following equilibrium values for the second stage are derived for each party. 
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Thus, at the first stage, the Donor Country’s proposal is accepted by the 
Private Lenders and the Borrower Country if they are offered the shares of the 
discounted value of   
̂
 and   
̂
 respectively and the Donor Country receives the 
rest of the share, defined as below; 
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At equilibrium, the Borrower Country will export all its output each period, 
and the Private Lenders will receive its share,   , which corresponds to the 
maximum amount of the repayment that the Private Lenders can expect to receive 
from the Borrower Country. Therefore, the lending ceiling per period,  , is set at the 
discounted value of    as 
  
    
    
    
  
(    )
 (     )(     )
(    ) (    )(     )(     ) (    )(     )(     ) (    )(     )(     ) 
     
(4) 
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Thus, as its share,   , gets smaller, its lending ceiling becomes lower, since 
its lending ceiling is guaranteed by its share to be received. 
The difference between the Donor Country’s welfare,    , and the Donor 
Country’s share,   , defines the maximum amount of the grant aid,  , which is to be 
provided. 
         
  
(     ){(     )(    ) (     )(    )}
(    )(     )(     ) (    )(     )(     ) (    )(     )(     )
      
 
(     )(     )(         )
(    )(     )(     ) (    )(     )(     ) (    )(     )(     )
      
(5) 
Thus, as its welfare gains,    , is higher, the grant ceiling becomes higher, 
since the grant to be provide is supposed to be financed from the Donor Country’s 
trade gains. On the other hand, as its share,   , gets smaller, the grant ceiling gets 
higher, since the grant ceiling is defined as the amount that the Donor Country has to 
compensate the Private Lender and the Borrower Country for avoiding default. 
 
3.2. Comparative Statics 
By comparative statics, it is useful to examine how the red light signal,  , 
affects the lending ceiling and the grant ceiling. For simplicity, let me assume that 
   
  
  , 
   
  
  , and 
   
  
  . First assumption is plausible, since the bilateral aid 
donors supported introduction of the traffic light system. Second assumption is 
reasonable, since the Borrower Country knows its own debt situation before the traffic 
light is revealed, which means that the traffic light is basically no surprising news to 
the Borrower Country.  
 
3.2.1. Lending Ceiling 
Let   be the denominator of (4). Then,  
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From the equation (6), 
  (  ( )  ( ))
  
  , if 
   
  
  . On the other hand, if 
   
  
  , then the sign of 
  (  ( )  ( ))
  
 is that of {
   
  
 (     )  
   
  
 (     )}. 
In order to see the sign of {
   
  
 (     )  
   
  
 (     )}, define   such that 
   
  
   
   
  
. Here,   measures how the Donor Countries’ subjective default 
probability respond to the traffic light relative to the Private Lenders’ subjective 
default probability’s change. Therefore, if the Donor Countries respond to the traffic 
light more aggressively than the Private Lenders, then    , and likewise, if the 
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Donor Countries respond to the traffic light less aggressively than the Private Lenders, 
then      . Then,  
{
   
  
 (     )  
   
  
 (     )}  
   
  
 { (     )  (     )}  (7) 
From the equation (7), if   takes larger value, then it is more likely that (7) 
would be positive. In other words, if the Donor Countries are expected to respond 
aggressively to the traffic light, then the Private Lenders are likely to increase their 
lending ceiling. Especially, if we assume (     )  (     ), then the equation 
(7) is always negative for      , and could be positive if and only if    . 
Namely, if the Donor Countries are expected to respond only mildly to the traffic light, 
then the Private Lenders reduce their lending ceiling, but if the Donor Countries are 
expected to respond more aggressively to the traffic light than the Private Lenders, 
then the Private Lenders is more likely to increase their lending ceiling, which exactly 
is the free-riding by the Private Lenders.  
To summarize the results, there are following three cases. 
<case L1> If 
   
  
  , then 
  
  
  . 
<case L2> If 
   
  
  , and if   is small enough (such as      ), then 
  
  
  . 
<case L3> If 
   
  
  , and if   is large enough (such as    ), then 
  
  
  . 
<case L1> and <case L3> are the free-riding cases.  
<case L1> is the case that the traffic light system is delivering the totally 
wrong signal to the Private Lenders. This case may be avoidable if the World Bank 
and IMF provide enough information of how the traffic light system works and could 
convince the Private Lenders accordingly.  
<case L3> indicates the serious problem of the traffic light system. Even 
though the system delivers the correct signal to the Private Lenders, they may increase 
their lending if they expect that the Donor Countries would respond more aggressively. 
 12 
 
 
3.2.2. Grant Ceiling 
Let   be the denominator of (5). Then,  
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From the equation (8), 
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  , if 
   
  
  . On the other hand, if 
   
  
  , then the sign of 
  (  ( )  ( ))
  
 is that of the bracket term. In order to see the 
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sign of the bracket term, define   such that   
   
  
 
   
  
. Here,   measures how 
the Private Lenders’ subjective default probability respond to the traffic light relative 
to the Donor Countries’ subjective default probability’s change. Therefore, if the 
Private Lenders respond to the traffic light more aggressively than the Donor 
Countries, then    , and likewise, if the Private Lenders respond to the traffic light 
less aggressively than the Donor Countries, then      .  
From the equation (8), if   takes larger value, then it is more likely that (8) 
would be negative. In other words, if the Private Lenders are expected to respond 
aggressively to the traffic light, then the Donor Countries are likely to reduce their 
grant ceiling. Especially, if we assume (     )  (     ) and (     )  
(    ), then the equation (8) is always negative for    , and could be positive if 
and only if      . Namely, if the Private Lenders are expected to respond 
aggressively to the traffic light, then the Donor Countries reduce their grant ceiling, 
but if the Private Lenders are expected to respond only mildly to the traffic light than 
the Donor Countries, then the Donor Countries is more likely to increase their grant 
ceiling.  
To summarize the results, there are following three cases. 
<case G1> If 
   
  
  , then 
  
  
  . 
<case G2> If 
   
  
  , and if   is large enough (such as    ) , then 
  
  
  . 
<case G3> If 
   
  
  , and if   is small enough (such as      ) then 
  
  
  . 
<case G1> and <case G3> are the free-riding cases, since it corresponds to 
<case L1> and <case L3> respectively, which is simply because   
 
 
 by definition.  
Thus, increase in the lending ceiling by the Private Lenders occurs along with 
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increase in the grant ceiling by the Donor Countries, which implies that the Private 
Lenders extract resources from the Donor Countries. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
Before conducting the empirical analyses, let me summarize what is predicted 
by the theory, developed in the previous section. The results of the comparative statics 
are summarized in Table 1-1.  
 
Table 1-1: Summary Table for Theoretical and Empirical Variables 
Theoretical 
Variable 
Expected Sign 
Empirical Variable 
for   for   
    
Private Lenders’ 
Foreign Claims 
    
ODA 
Grant Commitment 
  
  for large     for small   
Red Light Dummy 
(1=Red Light) 
  for small     for large   
      
Borrower’s Aid Dependency 
(% of GNI) 
      
Borrower’s Sort-Term Debt 
(% of Total External Debt) 
        
Exports from Donor to Borrower 
(million US$) 
        
Imports to Donors from 
Borrowers 
(million US$) 
       
Donor’s Real Interest Rate 
(%) 
       
Borrower’s Real Interest Rate 
(%) 
       
Lender’s Real Interest Rate 
(%) 
    *  * unobservable 
   0* 0* unobservable 
   ±* ±* unobservable 
* The expected sign is of the assumption. 
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The theory predicts how the lending ceiling as well as the grant ceiling is 
determined by the games among the three parties, the Private Lender, the Borrower 
Country, and the Donor Country, and the basic structure of the model describes how to 
split the welfare gains from avoiding default to three parties. Therefore, the higher the 
welfare gains are, the higher what they receive as their shares. For the following 
empirical analyses, let the trade flows between the Borrower Country and the Donor 
Country be the welfare gains. Thus, in case of the lending ceiling, if they are the 
important trade partners, then the lending ceiling becomes higher, which is represented 
by the positive expected sign of     and     on   in Table 1-1. On the other 
hand, the case of the grant ceiling is not straightforward. Since the grant ceiling is 
positively correlated with the trade benefits to the Donor Country from the equation 
(5), the expected sign of     on   is positive in Table 1-1. However, because the 
Donor Country’s share is negatively correlated with the grant ceiling,     has the 
negative expected sign on  . 
Due to the structure of the model, the more impatient the parties are in 
reaching a settlement (i.e. the higher   are), the smaller their shares become. This is 
represented by the positive expected sign of    and   , and the negative expected 
sign of    on the lending ceiling. In case of the grant ceiling, the other parties’ 
impatience leads to the higher share of its own, which results in lower grant ceiling. 
Likewise higher impatience of its own reduces its share, which results in higher grant 
ceiling.  
 
4.1. Data and Specification 
The dataset consists of annual observations of 18 out of 24 OECD-DAC 
members and 59 out of 64 “IDA-only” countries for the period of 2000-2010. (Please 
see Appendix 1-3 for the sample countries list.) The data can be classified into (i) 
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provider-recipient country pair flow data, (ii) IDA’s traffic light, and (iii) data of on 
other controls. 
For (i) provider-recipient country pair flow data, the dataset includes there 
types of flow; export/import flow between the provider country and the recipient 
country, the official development assistance flow from the provider country to the 
recipient country, and the banking cross-border claims from the provider countries 
where the lenders reside to the recipient country. Consequently, the dataset contains 
1,062 country pair (18 times 59). These are the dependent variables. For (ii) IDA’s 
traffic light, dummy variable, which takes a value of 1 if the country is classified as 
“red light”, was constructed. This is the key explanatory variable. Since the World 
Bank’s fiscal year starts July and ends June, there is a six-month period mismatch to 
other data. Therefore, when estimating models, the current and the one period lagged 
values are to be included in the models. For (iii) data of on other controls, there are 
bilateral relationship data (such as distance, colonial relationship, and common 
language) as well as economic data of each country (such as real interest rate, GNI per 
capita, and GDP growth rate). Among them, the most important data are the aid 
dependency of the recipient country and the short-term debt ratio. The former is 
supposed to be a proxy of   defined in 3.2.1., and the latter is suppose to be a proxy 
of   defined in 3.2.2.. (Please see Appendix 1-2 for data sources.) 
Since conditions that lead a pair of countries to be more interdependent in 
trade are likely to lead more private lending and grand aid flow between them, the 
model specification follows the gravity model of international trade. The specification 
is as follows; 
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where the subscript i denotes the donor/lender country, j denotes the borrower country, 
and t denotes time. The variables are defined as; 
     : the private lending and the ODA grant commitment flow 
   : dummy that takes a value of 1 if the country is classified as “red light” 
      : export from donor/lender country to borrower country 
      : import by donor/lender country from borrower country 
        : real interest rate 
   : GNI per capita 
   : GDP growth rate 
      : aid dependency defined as aid inflow % of GNI 
      : short-term debt (maturity with less than a year) % of total external debt stock 
      : other control variables 
       : dummy that takes a value of 1 if two countries share a common official 
language 
      : dummy that takes a value of 1 if two countries have ever had a colonial link 
        : distance between their Capital Cities 
           : time invariant fixed effect of each country pair 
 
4.2. Analysis on Structural Break 
Before conducting detailed analysis, it is necessary to verify that there exist 
the “structural break” when the IDA’s traffic light system was introduced in 2004.  
It is visually not obvious that there is the trend difference between the period 
before and after 2004. (See Figure 1-2.) In order to examine whether this is the case, 
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Chow test was conducted by separating the sample to Pre-IDA traffic light system 
period (2000-2003) and Post-IDA traffic light system period (2004-2010). Chow test 
is F-test to the null hypothesis that the coefficients on both periods are same. (i.e. there 
is no structural difference after the traffic light system was introduced.) 
According to the results presented in Table 1-2, the null hypothesis is rejected 
in both cases of private lending and ODA grant as a dependent variable. Therefore, it 
is possible to conclude that there is the structural break when IDA’s traffic light 
system was introduced. 
 
 
Figure 1-2: ODA Grant and Private Lending Flow 
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Table 1-2: Structural Break Analysis 
                         
Private Lenders’ Foreign Claims ODA Grant Commitment 
Pre-IDA 
2000-2003 
Post-IDA 
2004-2008 
Pre-IDA 
2000-2003 
Post-IDA 
2004-2008 
constant -22.904 
[0.460] 
-13.730 
[0.217] 
-25.787 
[0.003]*** 
-19.699 
[0.059]* 
Exports from Donor to Borrower 
(million US$) 
0.008 
[0.489] 
0.069 
[0.000]*** 
0.055 
[0.000]*** 
0.036 
[0.000]*** 
Imports to Donors from Borrowers 
(million US$) 
0.004 
[0.388] 
-0.001 
[0.419] 
-0.001 
[0.550] 
-0.002 
[0.215] 
Borrower’s Real Interest Rate 
(%) 
0.472 
[0.010]*** 
-0.163 
[0.499] 
-0.010 
[0.856] 
-0.526 
[0.012]** 
Borrower’s GNI per capita 
(current US$) 
0.004 
[0.403] 
0.003 
[0.213] 
-0.002 
[0.357] 
-0.010 
[0.000]*** 
Borrower’s GDP Growth Rate 
(annual %) 
-0.727 
[0.028]** 
1.346 
[0.006]*** 
-0.057 
[0.668] 
-0.402 
[0.361] 
Borrower’s Aid Dependency 
(% of GNI) 
0.295 
[0.255] 
0.937 
[0.000]*** 
0.653 
[0.000]*** 
0.242 
[0.036]** 
Borrower’s Sort-Term Debt 
(% of Total External Debt) 
0.240 
[0.230] 
0.354 
[0.054]** 
-0.197 
[0.021]** 
-0.029 
[0.864] 
Borrower’s Total Reserves 
(% of Total External Debt) 
-0.019 
[0.900] 
-0.094 
[0.007]*** 
-0.042 
[0.471] 
0.125 
[0.000]*** 
Borrower’s Population 
 
2.28e-07 
[0.002]*** 
1.24e-07 
[0.897] 
1.74e-07 
[0.000]*** 
4.42e-07 
[0.000]*** 
Borrower’s Terms of Trade 
 
0.140 
[0.653] 
-0.008 
[0.897] 
0.170 
[0.040]** 
0.084 
[0.112] 
Donor’s Real Interest Rate  
(%) 
-0.071 
[0.930] 
-2.232 
[0.019]** 
-0.436 
[0.143] 
-0.886 
[0.326] 
Donor’s GNI per capita 
(current US$) 
-0.0001 
[0.638] 
-0.00002 
[0.917] 
0.0004 
[0.005]*** 
0.0004 
[0.031]** 
Donor’s GDP growth rate 
(annual %) 
1.962 
[0.148] 
0.524 
[0.515] 
0.192 
[0.686] 
0.416 
[0.543] 
Donor’s Population 
 
-2.45e-08 
[0.459] 
-1.33e-08 
[0.647] 
1.06e-07 
[0.000]*** 
3.52e-07 
[0.000]*** 
R
2
 0.02 0.10 0.18 0.14 
observation 1,369 3,068 2,443 3,954 
Chow test 
(    no structural break at 2004) 
2.64 
[0.001]*** 
9.21 
[0.000]** 
Note:  p-value is reported in [ ] and *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
respectively 
 
4.3. Country Pair Panel Analysis 
Table 1-3 presents the estimated results of country pair panel data analysis.
  
2
0
 
Table 1-3: Country Pair Panel Estimation 
                               
Private Lenders’ Foreign Claims ODA Grant Commitment 
Model (1) 
Fixed-Effect 
Model (2) 
Random-Effect 
Model (3) 
IV 
Model (4) 
Fixed-Effect 
Model (5) 
Random-Effect 
Model (6) 
Random-Effect 
Model (7) 
IV 
Red Light dummy at current period 
(1=Red Light Country) 
17.376 
[0.098]* 
10.970 
[0.184] 
17.484 
[0.097]* 
1.800 
[0.822] 
-11.243 
[0.105] 
-11.897 
[0.084]* 
1.621 
[0.840] 
Red Light dummy at previous period 
(1=Red Light Country) 
-10.089 
[0.296] 
-18.108 
[0.026]** 
-10.654 
[0.272] 
0.515 
[0.944] 
-2.834 
[0.674] 
-4.379 
[0.515] 
0.934 
[0.900] 
Exports from Donor to Borrower 
(million US$) 
-0.015 
[0.433] 
0.070 
[0.000]*** 
0.049 
[0.410] 
-0.050 
[0.001]*** 
0.023 
[0.001]*** 
0.019 
[0.006]*** 
-0.103 
[0.032]** 
Imports to Donors from Borrowers 
(million US$) 
0.007 
[0.303] 
-0.003 
[0.096]* 
- 
-0.006 
[0.288] 
0.001 
[0.625] 
0.001 
[0.455] 
- 
Borrower’s Real Interest Rate 
(%) 
0.081 
[0.835] 
-0.165 
[0.525] 
0.139 
[0.725] 
-1.650 
[0.000]*** 
-0.638 
[0.006]*** 
-0.607 
[0.008]*** 
-1.676 
[0.000]*** 
Borrower’s GNI per capita 
(current US$) 
-0.018 
[0.081]* 
0.001 
[0.623] 
-0.023 
[0.044]** 
-0.018 
[0.025]** 
-0.013 
[0.000]*** 
-0.012 
[0.000]*** 
-0.015 
[0.091]* 
Borrower’s GDP Growth Rate 
(annual %) 
1.802 
[0.011]** 
2.000 
[0.001]*** 
1.894 
[0.009]*** 
-0.784 
[0.169] 
-0.369 
[0.465] 
-0.233 
[0.643] 
-0.842 
[0.143] 
Borrower’s Aid Dependency 
(% of GNI) 
1.266 
[0.000]*** 
1.019 
[0.000]** 
1.239 
[0.000]*** 
0.650 
[0.001]*** 
0.354 
[0.009]*** 
0.281 
[0.035]** 
0.669 
[0.001]*** 
Borrower’s Short-Term Debt 
(% of Total External Debt) 
-1.188 
[0.007]*** 
0.195 
[0.361] 
-1.195 
[0.007]*** 
-0.481 
[0.180] 
-0.128 
[0.539] 
-0.050 
[0.805] 
-0.445 
[0.219] 
Borrower’s Total Reserves 
(% of Total External Debt) 
0.379 
[0.005]*** 
-0.056 
[0.136] 
0.349 
[0.009]*** 
0.196 
[0.046]** 
0.154 
[0.000]*** 
0.129 
[0.000]*** 
0.204 
[0.038]** 
Borrower’s Population 
 
-8.17e-06 
[0.000]*** 
-9.90e-09 
[0.911] 
-9.43e-06 
[0.000]*** 
-0.00002 
[0.000]*** 
3.39e-07 
[0.000]*** 
3.82e-07 
[0.000]*** 
-0.00001 
[0.000]*** 
Borrower’s Terms of Trade 
 
0.284 
[0.177] 
-0.014 
[0.831] 
0.286 
[0.174] 
-0.230 
[0.126] 
0.050 
[0.424] 
0.053 
[0.386] 
-0.227 
[0.133] 
Donor’s Real Interest Rate  
(%) 
0.916 
[0.653] 
-1.741 
[0.102] 
0.673 
[0.744] 
-2.088 
[0.206] 
-1.168 
[0.276] 
-1.197 
[0.264] 
-1.847 
[0.270] 
Donor’s GNI per capita 
(current US$) 
0.002 
[0.015]** 
-0.0008 
[0.687] 
0.003 
[0.008]*** 
0.003 
[0.000]*** 
0.0004 
[0.141] 
0.0004 
[0.058]* 
0.003 
[0.000]*** 
Donor’s GDP growth rate 
(annual %) 
0.450 
[0.655] 
0.495 
[0.567] 
0.446 
[0.659] 
-0.767 
[0.289] 
0.448 
[0.508] 
0.445 
[0.511] 
-0.763 
[0.292] 
Donor’s Population 
 
-2.07e-06 
[0.156] 
-1.07e-08 
[0.735] 
-2.00e-06 
[0.322] 
7.03e-06 
[0.000]*** 
3.88e-07 
[0.000]*** 
3.85e-07 
[0.000]*** 
6.99e-06 
[0.000]*** 
Common Official Language dummy 
(1= if common official language) 
     27.502 
[0.000]*** 
 
Colonial Link dummy 
(1=if colonial link) 
     46.455 
[0.000]*** 
 
Distance      -0.001 
[0.276] 
 
constant 154.047 
[0.156] 
-7.824 
[0.531] 
160.525 
[0.130] 
-61.417 
[0.456] 
-6.419 
[0.629] 
-11.121 
[0.421] 
-75.925 
[0.367] 
   0.002 0.087 0.000 0.001 0.150 0.173 0.001 
F-test / Wald-test 
(    all    ) 
5.50 
[0.000]*** 
241.20 
[0.000]*** 
125.89 
[0.000]*** 
13.55 
[0.000]*** 
390.99 
[0.000]*** 
500.40 
[0.000]*** 
630.98 
[0.000]*** 
Hausman test 
(    Random-Effect Model is correct.) 
64.43 
[0.000]*** 
- 
57.06 
[0.000]*** 
- - 
observation 2,558 2,558 2,558 3,306 3,306 3,306 3,306 
Note:  p-value is reported in [ ] and *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively 
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Model (1) reports estimates of the fixed-effects model for the private lending 
flow. Dummy variable of “red light” at current period enters with a positive 
coefficient which is statistically significant. It indicates that the private lenders 
increase their lending to the borrower if its traffic light is red. This is clearly the 
evidence of free-riding by the private lenders. In addition, the borrower’s aid 
dependency, which is supposed to be a proxy of   defined in 3.2.1., has a positive 
and statistically significant coefficient and the borrower’s short-term debt, which is 
supposed to be a proxy of   defined in 3.2.2., has a negative and statistically 
significant coefficient, as predicted by the result of comparative statics. This also 
supports the evidence that the private lenders are free-riding on the international aid 
inflow. On the other hand, dummy variable of “red light” at previous period negative 
coefficient which is not statistically significant. Exports from the donor to the 
borrower has a negative and statistically insignificant coefficient, which is opposite to 
the prediction by the theoretical model developed in the previous section. The 
coefficient on borrower’s as well as donor’s real interest rate are not statistically 
significant. 
Model (2) reports estimates of the random-effects model for the private 
lending flow. Since the random-effects model was rejected by the Hausman test, it is 
not meaningful to go over the result of Model (2). 
Model (4) reports estimates of the fixed-effects model for the ODA grant 
commitment flow. Neither of dummy variable of “red light” at current period or at 
previous period has a statistically significant result, which implies that the bilateral 
donor countries do not respond to the traffic light. The borrower’s aid dependency, 
which is supposed to be a proxy of   defined in 3.2.1., has a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient, but the borrower’s short-term debt, which is supposed to be a 
proxy of   defined in 3.2.2., has a negative but statistically insignificant coefficient. 
 22 
 
Exports from the donor to the borrower has a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient, which is against to what is predicted by the theoretical model. The 
coefficient on the borrower’s real interest rate is negative and statistically significant, 
as predicted by the theoretical model.  
Model (5) reports estimates of the random-effects model for the ODA grant 
commitment flow. Like Model (2), the random-effects model was rejected by the 
Hausman test, it is not meaningful to go over the result of Model (5). 
The results of Model (4) seem mixed and difficult to interpret. One of the 
reasons behind this could be that the bilateral donor countries put more weight on 
other factors during their grant allocation decision making. As an example, Model (6) 
presents estimates which includes the bilateral relationship variables; common 
language, colonial link, and distance. Since the random-effects model is rejected, the 
result is only for reference. The language and colonial links enters positive and 
statistically significant coefficients. Therefore, the bilateral donor countries take into 
account its cultural and historical relationship. And these effects are absorbed into the 
country pair fixed effects in Model (4). 
The causality between the export/import flow and the private lending flow 
and/or the ODA grant flow seems opposite, especially for the private lending flow, 
from what the theory predicts. For instance, the private lending might be associated 
with the trade credit which supports export/import. Therefore, the private lending 
would promote larger volume of trade flow. Or if the provided ODA grant contributes 
to the recipient country’s growth, the ODA grant might increase the recipient export 
flow. If this is the case, the causality is indeed reversed. In order to manage this 
problem of endogeneity, the two-staged least squares estimation by using instrument 
variables (IV model) is considered in Model (3) and Model (7). As the instruments, (i) 
the import by donor from the borrower, (ii) dummy variable of common language, 
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(iii) dummy variable of colonial links, and (iv) distance between the borrower country 
and the donor country are used. The result for Model (3) reversed the sign of 
coefficient on the export flow into positive, as predicted by the theoretical model, 
although its statistical significance remains low. The basic results remain same as 
Model (4), while the exports lose its explanatory powers. 
Table 1-4 explores the sensitivity of the results, for the ODA-related variables, 
by using different dependent variables. For Model (8) through (11), the traffic light 
does not affect the dependent variables. 
Model (8) uses the Grant Commitment as the dependent variable but 
excluding France, Germany and Japan, which are the largest ODA loan provider 
among OECD-DAC. Model (9) uses the Grant Commitment of these three countries 
only. 
Model (10) uses the ODA Loan Commitment as the dependent variable for all 
samples of Post-IDA period. Model (11) uses the ODA Loan Commitment of France, 
Germany and Japan. 
Model (12) uses the ODA Grant Ratio, defined as the ODA Grant 
Commitment divided by the ODA Total Commitment, for all samples of Post-IDA 
period. Model (13) uses the ODA Grant Ratio of France, Germany and Japan. For both 
models, the Grant Ratio decreases in response to the red light signal, which is hard to 
interpret. One of the possible interpretations is that the ODA Loan might increase 
relative to the ODA Grant, which results in the decreasing Grant Ratio. However, this 
interpretation is not supported by the statistical analysis, since reactions of both the 
ODA Loan and the ODA Grant are not statistically significant. 
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Table 1-4: Sensitivity Check for ODA Variables 
                              
ODA Grant Commitment  ODA Loan Commitment  ODA Grant Ratio  
Model (8) 
Excluding France, 
Germany and Japan 
Model (9) 
France, Germany and Japan 
only 
Model (10) 
All Samples 
Model (11) 
France, Germany and Japan 
only 
Model (12) 
All Samples 
Model (13) 
France, Germany and Japan 
only 
Red Light dummy at current period 
(1=Red Light Country) 
-0.324 
[0.749] 
2.683 
[0.914] 
0.636 
[0.713] 
2.839 
[0.694] 
-0.017 
[0.094]* 
-0.072 
[0.029]** 
Red Light dummy at previous period 
(1=Red Light Country) 
2.746 
[0.682] 
-10.818 
[0.638] 
1.045 
[0.513] 
-1.680 
[0.802] 
0.007 
[0.455] 
0.030 
[0.333] 
Exports from Donor to Borrower 
(million US$) 
-0.054 
[0.000]*** 
-0.029 
[0.613] 
0.019 
[0.000]*** 
0.072 
[0.000]*** 
-0.00002 
[0.311] 
-0.00002 
[0.792] 
Imports to Donors from Borrowers 
(million US$) 
-0.005 
[0.273] 
-0.001 
[0.974] 
-0.0003 
[0.838] 
-0.025 
[0.068]* 
3.27e-06 
[0.649] 
0.00003 
[0.609] 
Borrower’s Real Interest Rate 
(%) 
-1.109 
[0.000]*** 
-3.566 
[0.000]*** 
0.007 
[0.912] 
0.073 
[0.790] 
0.0003 
[0.446] 
0.00003 
[0.411] 
Borrower’s GNI per capita 
(current US$) 
-0.013 
[0.077]* 
-0.023 
[0.319] 
0.002 
[0.229] 
0.003 
[0.616] 
-0.000002 
[0.135] 
-0.00002 
[0.553] 
Borrower’s GDP Growth Rate 
(annual %) 
-0.540 
[0.300] 
-1.642 
[0.345] 
0.081 
[0.510] 
0.365 
[0.472] 
-0.001 
[0.070]* 
-0.007 
[0.005]*** 
Borrower’s Aid Dependency 
(% of GNI) 
0.292 
[0.103] 
2.112 
[0.001]*** 
0.021 
[0.620] 
0.031 
[0.869] 
-0.0004 
[0.099]* 
-0.002 
[0.021]** 
Borrower’s Short-Term Debt 
(% of Total External Debt) 
-0.180 
[0.578] 
-1.696 
[0.136] 
0.004 
[0.959] 
0.209 
[0.528] 
0.0006 
[0.162] 
0.002 
[0.300] 
Borrower’s Total Reserves 
(% of Total External Debt) 
0.122 
[0.166] 
0.653 
[0.050]** 
0.042 
[0.049]** 
0.081 
[0.403] 
-0.00001 
[0.930] 
-0.0001 
[0.847] 
Borrower’s Population 
 
-7.46e-06 
[0.000]*** 
-0.00005 
[0.000]*** 
7.87e-07 
[0.015]** 
4.57e-06 
[0.002]*** 
-2.39e-09 
[0.202] 
-1.44e-08 
[0.029]** 
Borrower’s Terms of Trade 
 
-0.067 
[0.621] 
-0.853 
[0.084]* 
0.020 
[0.546] 
-0.035 
[0.810] 
-0.0002 
[0.201] 
-0.001 
[0.206] 
Donor’s Real Interest Rate  
(%) 
-0.795 
[0.554] 
0.836 
[0.971] 
0.562 
[0.115] 
21.852 
[0.001]* 
0.001 
[0.697] 
--0.038 
[0.217] 
Donor’s GNI per capita 
(current US$) 
0.002 
[0.015]** 
0.008 
[0.007]*** 
-0.0002 
[0.310] 
-0.002 
[0.055]* 
6.52e-07 
[0.485] 
8.28e-06 
[0.044]** 
Donor’s GDP growth rate 
(annual %) 
-0.906 
[0.177] 
-0.533 
[0.832] 
0.383 
[0.014]** 
0.285 
[0.697] 
-0.001 
[0.078]* 
0.0002 
[0.951] 
Donor’s Population 
 
6.04e-06 
[0.000]*** 
-0.00001 
[0.419] 
-3.05e-07 
[0.316] 
1.55e-06 
[0.721] 
9.22e-10 
[0.601] 
-1.67e-08 
[0.399] 
constant -106.51 
[0.077]* 
1,946.69 
[0.146] 
-2.621 
[0.883] 
-193.05 
[0.621] 
0.999 
[0.000]*** 
2.626 
[0.140] 
   0.032 0.085 0.015 0.144 0.001 0.012 
F-test / Wald-test 
(    all    ) 
6.82 
[0.000]*** 
9.70 
[0.000]*** 
4.19 
[0.000]*** 
4.20 
[0.000]*** 
1.48 
[0.099]* 
1.99 
[0.012]** 
observation 2,627 679 3,315 679 3,306 679 
Note:  p-value is reported in [ ] and *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively 
 
 25 
 
4.4. Robustness Checks 
Table 1-5 presents the estimated results of robustness checks for the private 
lending flows.  
Model (14) use the log transformation of the level data, with fixed-effect. 
Specifically, the private lenders’ foreign claims, the export, the import, GNI per capita, 
and population are transformed into log. The red light dummy at current period loses 
statistical significance. The aid dependency variable remains its statistical significance.  
Model (15) explores the case of autocorrelation of the error term. The red 
light dummy at current period maintains the positive sign but lose its statistical 
significance. The aid dependency variable also loses its statistical significance. 
Model (16) includes the one-period lagged ODA Grant Commitment to the 
explanatory variables. The red light dummy at current period as well as the lagged 
ODA Grant Commitment are found to be positive and statistically significant, while 
the aid dependency variable loses its statistical significance.  The correlation between 
the lagged ODA Grant Commitment and the aid dependency variables seems to make 
the result noisy to some extent. 
Model (17) explores the dynamic model by adding lagged dependent variable 
as regressors. The consistent estimator is derived from Arellano and Bond’s GMM 
method. The red light dummy at current period remains to be positive and its statistical 
significance. The aid dependency variable loses its statistical significance. The lagged 
private lending flow is positive and statistically significant, which indicates that the 
private lenders keep its lending flow pattern.  
Model (18) and Model (19) presents the results obtained by the Generalized 
Least Squares approach. Model (18) assumes heteroscedastic but uncorrelated error 
term, and Model (19) assumes heteroscedastic and autocorrelated error term for each 
country-pair. For both models, the red light dummy at current period as well as the aid 
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dependency are found to be positive and statistically significant, as predicted by the 
theory. In addition to that, however, the red light dummy at previous period is found to 
be negative, and the short-term debt is found to be positive, both of which are 
statistically significant. These results are against the theory. Especially, the positive 
sign of the short-term debt is hard to interpret. On the other hand, the negative sign of 
the red light dummy at previous period could be interpreted as follows. The private 
lenders front-load their lending flow to the borrower once its traffic light is revealed to 
be red for that period, which is represented by the positive sign of the red light dummy 
at current period, then wait and see how the traffic light of the next period would be, 
which is represented by the negative sign of the red light dummy at previous period. In 
summary, for the private lending flow, the coefficient on the red light dummy at 
current period, and the borrower’s aid dependency maintain the expected positive sign 
and statistical significance in most of the alternative specifications. 
Table 1-6 presents the estimated results of robustness checks for the ODA 
Grant Commitment flow. Each model is same as the one applied in Table 1-5. The 
results are mixed. In some specifications, the coefficient on the red light dummy at 
current period is rather negative and statistically significant, although the aid 
dependency and the short-term debt maintain their expected sign in most of cases. In 
summary, the results indicate the weak stability of the model for the ODA Grant 
Commitment.  
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Table 1-5: Robustness Checks for Private Lenders’ Foreign Claims 
                              
Private Lenders’ Foreign Claims 
Model (14) 
Fixed-Effect, 
log transformation 
Model (15) 
Fixed-Effect, 
AR(1) 
Model (16) 
Fixed-Effect, 
Including lagged ODA 
Grant 
Model (17) 
Dynamic 
Model (18) 
Heteroscedastic, 
Uncorrelated Error 
Model (19) 
Heteroscedastic, 
Panel Specific AR(1) 
Error 
Red Light dummy at current period 
(1=Red Light Country) 
0.212 
[0.454] 
10.534 
[0.458] 
17.050 
[0.011]** 
16.258 
[0.051]* 
1.458 
[0.015]** 
5.617 
[0.000]*** 
Red Light dummy at previous period 
(1=Red Light Country) 
-0.292 
[0.121] 
-11.536 
[0.363] 
-8.944 
[0.196] 
-14.451 
[0.232] 
-2.283 
[0.001]*** 
-8.954 
[0.000]*** 
Exports from Donor to Borrower 
(million US$) 
0.160 # 
[0.266] 
-0.045 
[0.071]* 
-0.015 
[0.852] 
-0.077 
[0.326] 
0.016 
[0.002]*** 
0.065 
[0.000]*** 
Imports to Donors from Borrowers 
(million US$) 
0.147 # 
[0.002]*** 
0.003 
[0.707] 
0.008 
[0.163] 
0.005 
[0.770] 
-0.0004 
[0.676] 
0.002 
[0.042]** 
Borrower’s Real Interest Rate 
(%) 
0.008 
[0.326] 
0.093 
[0.840] 
0.127 
[0.778] 
0.148 
[0.750] 
-0.010 
[0.688] 
-0.168 
[0.000]*** 
Borrower’s GNI per capita 
(current US$) 
-0.006 # 
[0.993] 
-0.008 
[0.627] 
-0.023 
[0.098]* 
-0.008 
[0.591] 
0.0003 
[0.318] 
0.001 
[0.002]*** 
Borrower’s GDP Growth Rate 
(annual %) 
0.077 
[0.000]*** 
1.711 
[0.066]* 
2.231 
[0.100]* 
1.571 
[0.148] 
0.189 
[0.006]*** 
1.250 
[0.000]*** 
Borrower’s Aid Dependency 
(% of GNI) 
0.004 
[0.044]** 
0.302 
[0.292] 
0.909 
[0.230] 
0.758 
[0.262] 
0.115 
[0.001]*** 
0.931 
[0.000]*** 
Borrower’s Short-Term Debt 
(% of Total External Debt) 
0.013 
[0.083]* 
-0.339 
[0.544] 
-1.773 
[0.246] 
-0.426 
[0.710] 
0.021 
[0.447] 
0.072 
[0.000]*** 
Borrower’s Total Reserves 
(% of Total External Debt) 
0.009 
[0.001]*** 
0.168 
[0.339] 
0.364 
[0.093]* 
0.122 
[0.509] 
-0.006 
[0.268] 
-0.053 
[0.000]*** 
Borrower’s Population 
 
1.023 # 
[0.723] 
-9.56e-06 
[0.005]*** 
-8.29e-06 
[0.014]** 
-5.58e-06 
[0.036]** 
-1.41e-09 
[0.860] 
-1.06e-08 
[0.189] 
Borrower’s Terms of Trade 
 
-0.002 
[0.652] 
0.465 
[0.077]* 
0.303 
[0.218] 
0.391 
[0.198] 
-0.008 
[0.203] 
-0.017 
[0.002]*** 
Donor’s Real Interest Rate  
(%) 
0.061 
[0.308] 
0.362 
[0.877] 
1.770 
[0.469] 
2.208 
[0.288] 
-0.223 
[0.007]*** 
-0.747 
[0.000]*** 
Donor’s GNI per capita 
(current US$) 
0.306 # 
[0.813] 
0.001 
[0.343] 
0.003 
[0.005]** 
0.001 
[0.239] 
5.17e-06 
[0.764] 
0.00003 
[0.175] 
Donor’s GDP growth rate 
(annual %) 
-0.050 
[0.067]* 
0.533 
[0.622] 
0.718 
[0.437] 
2.002 
[0.070]* 
0.092 
[0.227] 
0.332 
[0.000]*** 
Donor’s Population 
 
2.141 # 
[0.795] 
-2.54e-06 
[0.353] 
-2.17e-06 
[0.283] 
-3.48e-06 
[0.243] 
-1.15e-09 
[0.749] 
4.95e-09 
[0.173] 
lagged  
Private Lenders’ Foreign Claims 
   0.154 
[0.040]** 
  
lagged  
ODA Grant Commitment 
  0.069 
[0.059]* 
   
constant -56.50 
[0.656] 
249.18 
[0.045]** 
167.37 
[0.258] 
207.74 
[0.203] 
-1.027 
[0.371] 
-10.524 
[0.000]*** 
   0.127 0.001 0.001 - - - 
F-test / Wald-test 
(    all    ) 
5.22 
[0.000]*** 
2.13 
[0.006]*** 
1.99 
[0.011]** 
32.91 
[0.012]** 
35.52 
[0.003]*** 
12,603.24 
[0.000]*** 
observation 701 1,972 2,111 1,868 2,558 2,496 
Note:  p-value is reported in [ ] and *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively 
 # log transformed. 
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Table 1-6: Robustness Checks for ODA Grant Commitment 
                             
ODA Grant Commitment 
Model (20) 
Fixed-Effect, 
log transformation 
Model (21) 
Fixed-Effect, 
AR(1) 
Model (22) 
Fixed-Effect, 
Including lagged Private 
Lending 
Model (23) 
Dynamic 
Model (24) 
Heteroscedastic, 
Uncorrelated Error 
Model (25) 
Heteroscedastic, 
Panel Specific AR(1) 
Error 
Red Light dummy at current period 
(1=Red Light Country) 
-0.032 
[0.771] 
-2.138 
[0.729] 
-0.781 
[0.898] 
-6.349 
[0.122] 
-3.491 
[0.000]*** 
-7.577 
[0.000]*** 
Red Light dummy at previous period 
(1=Red Light Country) 
0.137 
[0.166] 
0.090 
[0.987] 
-0.391 
[0.956] 
-4.063 
[0.552] 
-3.188 
[0.000]*** 
-1.235 
[0.035]** 
Exports from Donor to Borrower 
(million US$) 
-0.019 # 
[0.669] 
-0.005 
[0.702] 
-0.050 
[0.152] 
-0.045 
[0.210] 
0.031 
[0.000]*** 
0.019 
[0.000]*** 
Imports to Donors from Borrowers 
(million US$) 
-0.004 # 
[0.863] 
0.0002 
[0.946] 
-0.005 
[0.384] 
-0.001 
[0.783] 
-0.0001 
[0.954] 
0.001 
[0.353] 
Borrower’s Real Interest Rate 
(%) 
-0.013 
[0.002]*** 
-0.091 
[0.654] 
-2.116 
[0.004]*** 
-1.535 
[0.016]** 
-0.214 
[0.000]*** 
-0.308 
[0.000]*** 
Borrower’s GNI per capita 
(current US$) 
-0.001 # 
[0.000]*** 
0.0002 
[0.981] 
-0.021 
[0.010]*** 
-0.016 
[0.050]** 
-0.006 
[0.000]*** 
-0.008 
[0.000]*** 
Borrower’s GDP Growth Rate 
(annual %) 
0.006 
[0.454] 
0.469 
[0.261] 
-0.705 
[0.107] 
-0.389 
[0.140] 
-0.025 
[0.617] 
-0.179 
[0.000]*** 
Borrower’s Aid Dependency 
(% of GNI) 
0.013 
[0.000]*** 
0.427 
[0.002]*** 
0.867 
[0.008]*** 
1.092 
[0.007]*** 
0.116 
[0.000]*** 
0.203 
[0.000]*** 
Borrower’s Short-Term Debt 
(% of Total External Debt) 
-0.011 
[0.101] 
-0.478 
[0.076]* 
-0.607 
[0.117] 
-1.221 
[0.062] 
0.017 
[0.430]*** 
0.012 
[0.656] 
Borrower’s Total Reserves 
(% of Total External Debt) 
0.004 
[0.003]** 
-0.207 
[0.003]*** 
0.071 
[0.642] 
-0.168 
[0.262] 
0.027 
[0.000]*** 
0.091 
[0.000]*** 
Borrower’s Population 
 
-2.324 # 
[0.041**] 
6.02e-06 
[0.000]*** 
-0.00002 
[0.018]** 
-0.00001 
[0.019]** 
2.23e-07 
[0.000]*** 
4.52e-07 
[0.000]*** 
Borrower’s Terms of Trade 
 
0.002 
[0.442] 
-0.020 
[0.856] 
-0.372 
[0.040] 
-0.273 
[0.068]* 
0.026 
[0.000]*** 
0.033 
[0.000]*** 
Donor’s Real Interest Rate  
(%) 
0.056 
[0.003]*** 
-1.216 
[0.233] 
-3.290 
[0.103] 
-3.339 
[0.087]* 
-0.571 
[0.000]*** 
-0.216 
[0.024]** 
Donor’s GNI per capita 
(current US$) 
0.595 # 
[0.245] 
-0.001 
[0.337] 
0.003 
[0.028]** 
0.003 
[0.005]*** 
-0.0002 
[0.000]*** 
0.0003 
[0.000]*** 
Donor’s GDP growth rate 
(annual %) 
-0.019 
[0.036]** 
-0.841 
[0.055]* 
0.982 
[0.232] 
-1.326 
[0.030]** 
0.025 
[0.690] 
0.165 
[0.000]*** 
Donor’s Population 
 
15.420 # 
[0.000]*** 
1.32e-06 
[0.041]** 
0.00001 
[0.002]*** 
5.61e-06 
[0.037]** 
1.91e-07 
[0.000]*** 
2.40e-07 
[0.000]*** 
lagged  
Private Lenders’ Foreign Claims 
  -0.013 
[0.775] 
   
lagged  
ODA Grant Commitment 
   0.215 
[0.005]*** 
  
constant -232.85 
[0.000]*** 
-156.01 
[0.000]*** 
-212.10 
[0.299] 
24.956 
[0.872] 
-5.038 
[0.000]*** 
-10.33 
[0.000]*** 
   0.053 0.112 0.014 - - - 
F-test / Wald-test 
(    all    ) 
8.38 
[0.000]*** 
3.84 
[0.000]*** 
1.70 
[0.039]** 
84.27 
[0.000]*** 
1,413.79 
[0.000]*** 
1,642.70 
[0.000]*** 
observation 3,062 2,597 2,144 2,419 3,306 3,256 
Note:  p-value is reported in [ ] and *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively 
 # log transformed. 
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5. Policy Implications and Way Forward 
The empirical results revealed two problems with the IDA’s traffic light 
system.  
Firstly, it is providing the opportunities to free ride for the private lenders. 
This is true even if the traffic light system delivers the correct signal, 
   
  
  , to the 
private lenders, if the private lenders expect that the donor countries would respond 
more aggressively to the traffic light. Therefore, it is crucial for the donor countries 
and the multilateral donor agencies to manage the private lenders’ expectations.  
There are the ex-ante and ex-post approaches. For the ex-ante approach, this 
could be done by promoting the policy dialogue among the donor communities, the 
private lenders and the borrower. In terms of each recipient country’s context, it would 
be most efficiently done if the policy dialogue is annually implemented at the timing 
that the traffic light of the next year is disclosed, especially for the red light countries. 
Possibly it would be appropriate for the World Bank to promote the policy dialogue at 
the timing of drafting or revising the Country Assistance Strategy. In terms of broader 
context, the World Bank/IMF needs to enhance their outreach to other international 
entities, such as OECD, the Paris Club, the London Club, and so forth where the 
bilateral aid and the private lending are settled. This would contribute to better 
management of the private lenders’ expectations.  
For the ex-post approach, revision to the IDA’s policy on non-concessional 
borrowing should be explored. The current policy burdens the responsibility to avoid 
non-concessional loans onto the borrower instead of the lenders. Therefore, when it is 
realized that the country borrows from some lenders in non-concessional terms, then it 
is the borrower country but not the lenders that are penalized. However, considering 
that typically the lenders have more bargaining power than the borrower, which is 
even more true in the developing countries’ case, it would not be appropriate to shift 
 30 
 
the responsibility only to the borrower country. It is necessary to introduce some 
counter-measure to punish the lenders’ side as well, for instance, excluding the 
specific non-concessional loans from the international debt settlement negotiation, 
such as the Paris Club or the London Club, in case that the country falls into sovereign 
default, which makes the lenders owe the default risk by themselves. It is noteworthy 
that in some extreme situations there is a possibility that the private lenders may try to 
extract resources, for instance the bail-out, from the aid donors in collusion with the 
borrower country by over-lending. Even though this is a risky strategy for the private 
lenders and the borrower country, it may work under the global/regional financial 
crises or the debt relief initiatives. In such situations, the close monitoring / 
surveillance by the multilateral organizations are greatly needed. 
Second problem is that the bilateral donor countries are not responding to the 
traffic light system well enough. Possible reasons behind this are two types of 
“division of labor”. First one is the division of labor between the grant aid and the loan 
aid agencies in the bilateral donor countries. Under the bilateral aid system, the grant 
aid agency and the loan aid agency are usually different entity under the control of the 
different ministries. Typically, the grant aid agency is under control of Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, and the loan aid agency is under control of Ministry of Finance. 
Therefore, each agency provides its own aid modality, grant or loan, to the recipient 
country, whatever their traffic light may be. This institutional rigidity might be making 
it difficult for the aid agencies to adjust to the traffic light. Another division of labor is 
the one among OECD-DAC members. Most of OECD-DAC members provide the 
grant aid only, and there are only a few countries, such as France, Germany, and Japan, 
that provide the loan aid in substantial volume. Hence, for the OECD-DAC members 
who provide the grant aid only, there is no room or reason to adjust their grant aid 
allocations in response to the recipient countries’ traffic light. Whatever the traffic 
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light is, their aid modality is limited to the grant aid. Since this problem stems from 
the bilateral aid architecture, it would be difficult for the World Bank/IMF to fix it. 
However, there seems to be a room for the bilateral aid donors themselves to improve 
their compliance to the traffic light system. Indeed, some of the bilateral aid donors 
are making efforts to introduce some innovative financing instruments. For instance, 
in 2007 French aid agency, AFD, introduced Counter Cyclical Loan. The AFD’s 
Counter Cyclical Loan provides the borrowing country with the option to defer 
payments when there is a bad external shock, such as export shock, whereby current 
exports fall below a moving average of past values. In the event of a shock, the 
borrower country has the opportunity to suspend its capital repayments up to a defined 
number of suspensions. The grace period of a loan is divided into a fixed initial grace 
period and a moving grace period, which can be used in the event of a shock. Another 
example is Japan’s Minimal Interest Rate Initiative for Low-Income LDCs, MIRAI. 
Under this scheme, 0.01% is applied to Japan’s ODA loan interest rate. By way of 
these innovative instruments, some of the bilateral aid donors are able to provide the 
loan aid without damaging the long-term debt sustainability of the borrower countries, 
and thus they are responding to the traffic light system correctly. Although these 
efforts contribute to higher concessionality, predictability, and flexibility of the loan 
aid, these factors are not reflected in the aid flow data.  
There are two issues to be considered for way forward. 
Firstly, one of the further refinements of the empirical analysis is to take into 
considerations the two shocks to the international aid flow. First one is the Gleneagles 
Summit in 2005. Based on the commitment made then, the bilateral aid donors are 
supposed to increase aid, especially grant aid, to Africa, which makes the bilateral aid 
donors to be more selective in providing aid because many of African countries have 
limited capacity to absorb and manage the increased aid properly. Thus, it is 
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conceivable that the grant aid has been inclined to flow toward the countries with 
better institutional capacity, which eventually reduces grant aid to the countries with 
poorer institutional capacity such as “red-light” countries. As a result, it appears that 
the bilateral aid donors are not responding to the traffic light appropriately. Second 
shock is the recent global financial crisis, which reduces the total volume of the 
international aid flow. Since the current data set includes only up to 2008, the problem 
is not too serious. But when extending the data set in future, it is necessary to control 
the effect. 
Secondly, there are two other key players who should be included in analyses, 
the emerging donors and the export credit agencies, both of which have been 
suspected to be free-riding on the traffic light system. Due to the different reasons of 
data limitations, both are omitted from the present analyses. For the emerging donors, 
since they do not owe any responsibility to report their activities to OECD-DAC, there 
is no systematic data available.  For the export credit agencies, they do report to 
OECD’s Credit Reporting System. But due to confidentiality of data, there is not 
disclosed data for the decomposed to each receiving country. Thus, for both of them 
only the aggregate flow data are available, which makes impossible to do country-pair 
analysis. However, as a complement to the present analyses, the aggregate data 
analyses would be useful. One of the attempt is recently conducted by Mwase (2011), 
who use aggregated data of Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRICs)’ development 
financing flows to Low-Income Countries (LICs). It finds that BRICs lend more to 
resource-rich LICs with weaker institutions, and that their degree of concessionality is 
negatively correlated with the amount of loans and positively correlated with better 
institutional indicators. Thus, it suggests that emerging donors are also free riding.  
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APPENDIX 
APPENDIX 1-1: DATA DESCRIPTION AND SOURCES 
 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS), Consolidated Banking Statistics, 2012 
CEPII, Geodesic Distances data base, CEPII 
IMF, 2012, Directions of Trade Statistics (DOTS), IMF. 
OECD, DAC (Development Assistance Committee) database on Aid, 2012. 
World Bank, 2012. Global Development Finance (GDF), Washington, D.C. 
World Bank, 2012. World Development Indicators (WDI), Washington, D.C. 
Variable Name Variable Description Data Source 
ODA Grant 
Commitment 
DAC countries’ grant aid commitment 
amount (current US$) 
OECD-DAC 
Export from Donor to 
Borrower 
(million US$) DOTS 
Import by Donor from 
Borrower 
(million US$) DOTS 
Private Lenders’ 
Foreign Claims 
Cross-border claims from donor country 
to borrower country plus foreign offices’ 
local claims (million US$) 
BIS 
Red Light dummy 
Dummy that takes a value of 1 if the 
country is classified as “red light” by the 
traffic light system 
author’s 
calculation 
Real interest rate Interest rate deflated by GDP WDI 
GNI per capita GNI per capita (constant 2000 US$) WDI 
GDP growth rate GDP growth rate (annual %) WDI 
Aid Dependency Aid % of GNI WDI 
Short-Term Debt 
Short-term (maturity less than a year) 
debt stock % of total external debt stock 
GDF 
Total Reserves Total Reserves % of Total External Debt WDI 
Population Total Population WDI 
Terms of Trade 
Net Barter Terms of Trade Index 
(2000=100) 
WDI 
Common Official 
Language 
Dummy that takes a value of 1 if two 
countries share a common official 
language 
CEPII 
Colony 
Dummy that takes a value of 1 if two 
countries have ever had a colonial link 
CEPII 
Distance 
Distance between Capital Cities 
(kilometers) 
CEPII 
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APPENDIX 1-2: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 Pre-IDA (2000-2004) 
Private Lenders’ Foreign Claims 5.86 71.69 -920 1,180.00 
ODA Grant Commitment 18.27 56.87 -0.46 1,397.02 
Red Light - - - - 
Export from Donor to Borrower 39.10 142.16 0 3,522.60 
Import by Donor from Borrower 53.68 366.65 0 15,556.50 
Borrowers’ Real interest rate 9.84 11.73 -72.56 40.18 
Borrowers’ GNI per capita 534.66 495.40 80 3,610.00 
Borrowers’ GDP growth rate 4.50 5.26 -31.30 33.63 
Borrowers’ Aid Dependency 12.84 10.36 0.40 98.81 
Borrowers’ Short-Term Debt 8.59 9.21 0 58.27 
Borrower’s Total Reserves 17.80 15.51 0.01 102.06 
Borrower’s Population 1.74e+07 2.66e+07 97431 1.39e+08 
Borrower’s Terms of Trade 98.56 13.46 24.35 143.43 
Donors’ Real interest rate 3.35 2.50 -0.09 11.62 
Donors’ GNI per capita 26,253.70 7,776.09 11,670 49,930.00 
Donors’ GDP growth rate 2.55 1.55 -0.91 5.94 
Donor’s Population 4.71e+07 6.64e+07 5,165,474 2.93e+08 
Common Official Language 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Colony 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Distance 7,649.82 3,558.55 944.14 17,744.08 
 Post-IDA (2005-2008) 
Private Lenders’ Foreign Claims 10.33 107.51 1,697 1,783.00 
ODA Grant Commitment 37.96 147.41 -2.74 3,830.19 
Red Light 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Export from Donor to Borrower 88.92 343.83 0 9,016.08 
Import by Donor from Borrower 136.58 1,049.14 0 35,652.00 
Borrowers’ Real interest rate 8.60 8.57 -32.00 37.87 
Borrowers’ GNI per capita 963.85 895.72 100 5,750 
Borrowers’ GDP growth rate 5.43 3.99 -7.11 22.70 
Borrowers’ Aid Dependency 14.07 18.12 0.32 185.94 
Borrowers’ Short-Term Debt 10.51 11.51 0 65.79 
Borrower’s Total Reserves 55.11 70.19 0.64 608.47 
Borrower’s Population 1.98e+07 2.99e+07 100,926 1.58e+08 
Borrower’s Terms of Trade 111.79 37.90 21.28 251.02 
Donors’ Real interest rate 1.43 1.97 -2.30 8.18 
Donors’ GNI per capita 40,814.35 9,971.19 18,060.00 71,520.00 
Donors’ GDP growth rate 1.20 2.80 -8.35 5.61 
Donor’s Population 4.90e+07 6.97e+07 5,246,096 3.09e+08 
Common Official Language 
same as pre-IDA Colony 
Distance 
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APPENDIX 1-3: SAMPLE COUNTRIES 
OECD-DAC Members (18 out of 24) 
 
IDA-only Countries (59 out of 64) 
Members data 
 
Countries data 
Australia    Afghanistan    
Austria   
 
Angola    
Belgium   
 
Bangladesh    
Canada   
 
Benin    
Denmark   
 
Bhutan  not included 
Finland    
 
Burkina Faso    
France   
 
Burundi    
Germany   
 
Cambodia    
Greece   
 
Cameroon   
Ireland not included 
 
Cape Verde    
Italy   
 
Central Africa Republic    
Japan   
 
Chad    
Korea not included 
 
Comoro   
Luxembourg not included 
 
Cote d’Ivore   
Netherlands   
 
Congo, Democratic Republic of   
New Zealand not included 
 
Republic of Congo    
Norway not included 
 
Djibouti    
Portugal   
 
East Timor  not included 
Spain   
 
Eritria not included 
Sweden   
 
Ethiopia    
Switzerland   
 
Gambia    
United Kingdom   
 
Ghana    
United States   
 
Guinea    
Commission of the European Communities not included 
 
Guinea-Bissau    
   
Guyana    
   
Haiti    
   
Honduras    
   
Kenya    
   
Kiribati  not included 
   
Kyrgyz Republic    
   
Lao PDR   
   
Lesotho  not included 
   
Liberia    
   
Madagascar    
   
Malawi    
   
Maldives    
   
Mali    
   
Mauritania    
   
Moldova    
   
Mongolia    
   
Mozambique    
   
Myanmar    
   
Nepal    
   
Nicaragua    
   
Niger    
   
Nigeria    
   
Rwanda    
   
Samoa    
   
Senegal    
   
Sierra Leone    
   
Somalia    
   
Solomon Islands   
   
Saotome & Principe   
   
Sri Lanka    
   
Sudan    
   
Tajikistan    
   
Tanzania    
   
Togo    
   
Tonga    
   
Uganda    
   
Vanuatu    
   
Vietnam    
   
Yemen    
   
Zambia    
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APPENDIX 1-4: IDA’S TRAFFIC LIGHT SYSTEM <FISCAL YEAR 2013> 
Country GNI per capita change from previous year 
Afghanistan n.a.  
Angola 4,060  
Bangladesh 770  
Benin 780 Yellow→Green 
Bhutan 2,070  
Burkina Faso 570 Red→Yellow 
Burundi 250  
Cambodia 830 Yellow→Green 
Cameroon 1,210  
Central African Republic 470  
Chad 690  
Comoro 770  
Congo, Democratic Republic of 190  
Congo, Republic of 2,270  
Cote d'Ivore 1,100 Red→Yellow 
Djibouti n.a. Red→Green 
East Timor n.a.  
Eritrea 430  
Ethiopia 400  
Gambia 610  
Ghana 1,410  
Guinea 440  
Guinea-Bissau 600  
Guyana n.a.  
Haiti 700  
Honduras 1,970  
Kenya 820  
Kiribati 2,110  
Kosovo 3,520  
Kyrgyz Republic 920  
Lao PDR 1,130  
Lesotho 1,220  
Liberia 240  
Madagascar 430  
Malawi 340  
Maldives 6,530  
Mali 610  
Marshall Islands 3,910  
Mauritania 1,000  
Micronesia 2,900  
Moldova 1,980  
Mozambique 470  
Myanmar n.a.  
Nepal 540  
Nicaragua 1,170  
Niger 360 Green→Yellow 
Nigeria 1,200  
Rwanda 570  
Samoa 3,190 Green→Yellow 
Saotome Principe 1,360  
Seirra Leone 340  
Senegal 1,070  
Solomon Islands 1,110  
Somalia n.a.  
Sudan 1,270  
Tajikistan 870  
Tanzania 540  
Togo 560  
Tonga 3,580  
Tuvalu 5,010 None→Red 
Uganda 510  
Vanuatu 2,870  
Yemen 1,070  
Zambia 1,160  
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High Risk → 100% Grant 
Moderate Risk → 50% Grant & 50% Loan 
Low Risk → 100% Loan 
 
APPENDIX 1-5: OVERVIEW OF IDA’S TRAFFIC LIGHT SYSTEM 
 
The Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF) analyzes both external and public sector 
debt on the net present value (NPV). To assess debt sustainability, debt burden 
indicators are compared to indicative thresholds over a 20-year projection period. The 
DSF classifies countries into one of three policy performance categories (strong, 
medium, and poor) using the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment (CPIA) index, and uses different indicative thresholds for debt burdens 
depending on the performance category. Thresholds for strong policy performers are 
highest—indicating that in countries with good policies debt accumulation is less risky. 
A debt-burden indicator that exceeds its indicative threshold suggests a risk of 
experiencing some form of debt distress. There are four possible ratings for the risk of 
debt distress: 
low risk (green light), when all the debt burden indicators are well below the 
thresholds; 
moderate risk (yellow light), when debt burden indicators are below the thresholds, 
but stress testing indicate that it could be breached in case of external shocks or abrupt 
policy changes; 
high risk (red light), when one or more debt burden indicators breach the thresholds; 
or  
in debt distress (red light), when the country is already having repayment difficulties. 
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CHAPTER 2 
NON-MONOTONIC RELATION OF DEBT-DEFAULT PROBABILITY 
UNDER THE WORLD BANK’S TRAFFIC LIGHT SYSTEM 
 
1. Introduction 
In 2004, the World Bank (IDA) introduced the debt sustainability framework 
(DSF) for low-income countries, so called “traffic light system”, based on which IDA 
determines the grant/loan ratio to be allocated to each recipient country for each fiscal 
year. For instance, the country receives 100% grant aid, if the country is classified as 
“red light” (i.e. its debt level is unsustainable), under the traffic light system. The 
World Bank and IMF have been requesting the other institutions (aid donors, export 
credit agencies and private lenders) to comply with this system, in order to maintain 
developing countries’ debt sustainability and to avoid another debt crises. 
There are some conceivable shortcomings of the traffic light system. One of 
the serious issues is that the traffic light system is based on the assumption which the 
relationship between debt and default probability is monotonic. Namely, the higher the 
debt level, the higher the default probability. However, this assumption may not hold 
in some cases such that a country makes productive investment by fully utilizing 
external financing which leads to higher economic growth and eventually reduces its 
default probability. If this is the case, the current threshold for external borrowing 
under the traffic light system could be too conservative for some countries. It is critical 
for the developing countries to grasp to what extent they can borrow and sustainably 
manage their debt without defaulting, since the developing countries typically 
experience difficulties to regain access to international credit market and international 
aid flow after they fall into default. 
Therefore I examine the relations between debt indicators and default 
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probability empirically. My hypothesis is that the current threshold is set at sub-
optimal level, which forces the developing countries to bear the costs in the way of 
foregone development opportunities. Another hypothesis is that the relationship 
between debt and default probability may not be a monotonic increasing, which is 
typically assumed. Specifically, the default probability could rather decrease at a 
certain level of debt, where external debt contribution to growth exceeds its raising 
effect of default probability (see Figure 1). If that is the case, and if the World Bank’s 
threshold is within the “default probability decreasing zone”, it may be possible to 
conclude that more lending is justified in some countries’ cases. 
The main contribution of this paper is to provide the theoretical model and the 
empirical results of the non-monotonic relationship between debt and default 
probability by using the panel data of the low-income countries. Since large part of 
previous (and voluminous) studies on sovereign default focus on emerging economies, 
this paper contributes to show how sovereign default of low-income countries is 
different from that of emerging economies.  
This paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the related 
literature and provides a motivation for the need for research on the monotonicity 
assumption of the debt-default probability relation. The third section describes the 
d
efau
lt  p
ro
b
ab
ility
 
debt/GDP 
debt/export 
0 
default probability 
decreasing zone?  
WB threshold? 
Figure 2-1: Non-Monotonic Relationship between Debt and Default Probability 
 42 
 
theoretical model. The fourth section presents the empirical results through the 
econometric analysis. The last section provides some policy implications and way 
forward. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Although there are abundant studies on sovereign default, the literature of 
sovereign default can be broadly categorized into two groups; (i) theoretical modeling 
of sovereign default, and (ii) empirical analyses on determinants of sovereign default.  
For the theoretical modeling literatures, there are two approaches; 
willingness-to-pay approach, and ability-to-pay approach. The willingness-to-pay 
approach focuses on the case where the borrowing country has the resources to repay 
but chooses not to because repayment is not optimal choice. Thus, the willingness-to-
pay approach depends on the relative costs of defaulting and fulfilling the obligation to 
repay, as emphasized by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). The ability-to-pay approach 
highlights the situation that the borrowing country is unable to meet its repayment 
obligations due to its debt burden. In this approach, whether the borrowing country is 
able to repay or not depends on its debt burden, measured, for instance, by the debt 
stock or the debt service, to its ability to pay, measured, for instance, by GDP, exports 
or revenues. However, it is hard to distinguish solvency problem from liquidity 
problem when assessing the country’s ability to pay, as described by Roubini (2001). 
One of the important theoretical works, which is related to ability-to-pay approach, is 
so-called “debt overhang” and “debt Laffer curve” theory. The literature about the 
debt overhang and the debt Laffer curve theory dates back to two papers by Krugman 
(1988) and Sachs (1989). Since then, both the theoretical and empirical works on them 
have been done. Claessens (1990) shows empirically that there are only a few indebted 
countries, five out of 29 middle-income countries, are on the wrong side of the debt 
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Laffer curve. Claessens et al. (1991) find that 6 to 15 out of 35 countries are on the 
wrong side of the debt Laffer curve, and that the empirical debt Laffer curve is 
typically flat, which indicates that it would be a mistake to overemphasize the question 
of whether the debt Laffer curve does eventually bend back. Deshpande (1997) 
examines the investment experience of 13 severely indebted countries through 1971-
1991 and shows that the relationship between the external debt and the investment is 
negative. Sen et al. (2007) uses several panel data econometric methods to show the 
existence of a debt overhang which impeded growth in Latin American economies 
severely and moderately in Asian region. Husain (1997) shows theoretically that a 
country can be on the wrong side of the debt Laffer curve only if it is on the wrong 
side of its tax Laffer curve. Agenor and Aizenman (2005) show that lower expected 
productivity, higher enforcement and verification costs, or higher volatility of 
productivity shocks, may shift a country to the wrong side of its debt Laffer curve with 
potentially sizable output and welfare losses. Reinhart, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2012) 
identifies major debt overhang episodes in the advanced economics since the early 
1800s, characterized by public debt to GDP levels exceeding 90% for at least five 
years, and finds that public debt overhang episodes are associated with growth over 
one percent lower than during other periods. 
For the empirical analyses on determinant of sovereign default, large volume 
of studies highlight the debt burden as the important factor which triggers the 
sovereign debt crises. In this perspective, the empirical analyses on determinant of 
sovereign default share common motivation with studies on a so-called “early warning 
system”, which use logit or probit regressions typically. Reinhart (2002) finds that a 
debt crisis is preceded by a currency crisis in about 85% of her sample of 59 countries 
for 1970-1999, which indicates that variables related to predicting a currency crisis are 
important to a sovereign debt crisis. Manasse, Roubini and Schimmelpfenning (2003) 
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estimates a logit model of sovereign debt crises for emerging markets of 1970-2002, 
and identifies macroeconomic variables reflecting both insolvency, illiquidity and 
other domestic and external macroeconomic factors that predict a debt crisis episode 
one year in advance. Their model predict about three quarters of all crises. Some 
recent literature on financial crisis has proposed on a number of possible non-linear 
“threshold” effects, by using a non-parametric method. Frankel (2004) use a classic 
probit and Regression Tree, which is a non-parametric method, to show that a high 
level of external debt do not necessarily lead to crises on their own but they do 
significantly raise the probability of crisis if capital inflows is tilted to the short term 
and is not used to build up reserves. Manasse and Roubini (2005) made an empirical 
investigation of the set of economic and political conditions that are associated with a 
likely occurrence of a sovereign debt crisis, based on data of 47 emerging market 
economies from 1970-2002. They use Binary Recursive Tree model to derive 
thresholds to classify defaulters and non-defaulters. The approach suggests that it is 
the particular combination of different types of vulnerability that may lead to default. 
There are some recent literatures which focus on factors other than debt itself. 
Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003) argue that the safe debt thresholds depend on a 
country’s default history, especially serial default record, by using the data set of 
history of credit events going back to 1820s for over 100 countries. The relevance of 
institutional quality is widely recognized and being confirmed by the previous studies. 
Among them, Kraay and Nehru (2004) empirically shows that three factors explain a 
substantial fraction of the cross-country and time-series variation in the incidence of 
debt distress: the debt burden, the quality of policies and institutions, and shocks. To 
the best of the author’s knowledge, Minea and Parent (2012) is the sole recent work 
which casts doubt on monotonicity assumption. Minea and Parent (2012), by using the 
Panel Smooth Threshold Regression (PSTR) model, shows an endogenously-
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estimated threshold around a debt-to-GDP ratio of 115%, above which the negative 
debt-growth link changes sign. Namely, the economic growth and public debt turns to 
be positively associated for debt ratio above 115%. Although the previous studies 
examine in depth the causes which trigger a sovereign default, the underlying common 
assumption, which is typically implicit, is the monotonic relationship between the 
default probability and the causes. Thus, higher default probability is derived from the 
higher level of the causes, whatever they are.  
While, there are some recent works on the non-linearity of the debt impact on the 
economic growth. Pattillo, Poirson and Ricci (2002) assess the non linear impact of 
external debt on growth using a large panel data set of 93 developing countries over 
1969-1998. The findings suggest that the average impact of debt becomes negative at 
about 160-170% of exports or 35-40% of GDP. The marginal impact of debts starts to 
be negative at about half of these values. Clements, Bhattacharya, and Nguyen (2003) 
find that, over a certain threshold, more debt lead to negative rates of growth. Those 
thresholds are lower than the ones used in the HIPC program (external debt is roughly 
115-120% of exports, or 30-37% of GDP.)  
My hypothesis is that the above-mentioned non-linear relationship between 
the debt and the economic growth, together with the linear accumulation of the debt 
may lead to the non-monotonic relationship between the default probability and the 
debt. However, none of the previous studies shed a light on this potential non-
monotonicity, which is this paper’s contribution. 
 
3. Theoretical Model 
In order to derive the non-monotonic relationship between debt stock and 
default probability, the theoretical model is constructed by modifying the Debt 
Overhang / Debt Laffer Curve model of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1994). 
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3.1. Debt Overhang / Debt Laffer Curve Model 
Consider two-period problem. On the 1
st
 period, the debtor country has an 
inherited debt stock of face value of  , owing to the foreign creditors, that will come 
due on the 2
nd
 period. The debtor country’s income is    in the 1
st
 period and 
    (  )    (  ) in the 2
nd
 period, where   is the productivity shock with mean 
       and distributed over [   ] with probability density function  ( ).    is 
the capital invested in the 1
st
 period, and   (  ) is its realized return in the 2
nd
 period, 
which is augmented by   (  ), interpreted as the long-term investment such as large-
scale infrastructure, which is invested before the 1
st
 period. It is assumed that only 
some fraction,  , of the inherited debt was accumulated as the productive capital, due 
to institutional / political constraints. Thus,   is interpreted as the efficiency measure 
of public investment. I assume the debtor country is risk-neutral with expected utility 
function;           , which is linear in consumption with no subjective discount 
factor.  
The creditors penalize the debtor country in the amount of      (  )  (  ), 
in case of default. Eliminating consumption levels by using constraints, 
        ,          (  )  (  )   in     (  )  (  )    
Then the debtor country’s maximization problems is  
 a 
  
 (  )         [   (  )  (  )   in      (  )  (  )   ] 
 a 
  
 (  )          (  )  (  )   (    ) (1) 
where  (    ) is the repayment which creditors actually expect to receive on the 2
nd
 
period. (And this sum is the debt’s market value.) Since the debtor country choose to 
default for realization of   such that      (  )  (  )   , that is when 
     {   (  )  (  )},  
 47 
 
 (    )      (  )  (  )
[
 
 
 
 
∫   ( )  
 
𝜂𝐹 (  )𝐹0(𝛿 )
𝐴
]
 
 
 
 
  
[
 
 
 
 
∫  ( )  
𝐴
 
𝜂𝐹 (  )𝐹0(𝛿 ) ]
 
 
 
 
 (2) 
The first term in the right-hand side of equation (2) captures payment in case of 
default and the second term captures payment in case of non-default.  
To see how the increase of the inherited debt stock affect the debtor country’s 
optimal investment, plugging (2) into (1), the following first order and second 
conditions are derived. 
  ′(  )  (  )
[   ∫   ( )  
 
𝜂𝐹 (  )𝐹0(𝛿 )
𝐴
]     (3) 
 ′′(  )    ′′(  )  (  )
[
 
 
 
 
   ∫   ( )  
 
𝜂𝐹 (  )𝐹0(𝛿 )
𝐴
]
 
 
 
 
 
 
    ′(  ) (
 
   (  )  (  )
)
 {  (  )}   (  )
   
 (4) 
The first order condition (3) states that the debtor country will invest up to a point 
where the expected marginal product of investment, net of expected additional penalty 
payment to creditors, equals the current consumption cost of investing (that is, 1). 
Thus, (3) defines the optimal investment   ( ). By implicit function theorem,  
   
  
   
′( ) 
  
𝐹 
 (  )𝐹0′(𝛿 )𝛿
[  𝜂 ∫ 𝐴 (𝐴) 𝐴
 
   (  ) 0(  )
 
] 
    (  ) (
 
   (  ) 0(  )
){   0 (  )  0(  )}
 {  (  )}
 { 0(  )}
 
   (  )
  (5) 
Since the denominator is negative from (4), the sign of   
′( ) is that of the 
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numerator. Thus, 
  
′( )    if   
𝐹0′(𝛿 )𝛿𝜂{𝐹 (  )}
 𝐹0(𝛿 )
𝐹 ′(  ) (
 
   (  ) 0(  )
){𝛿 𝐹0′(𝛿 ) 𝐹0(𝛿 )}
≡    (6) 
  
′( )    if   
𝐹0′(𝛿 )𝛿𝜂{𝐹 (  )}
 𝐹0(𝛿 )
𝐹 ′(  ) (
 
   (  ) 0(  )
){𝛿 𝐹0′(𝛿 ) 𝐹0(𝛿 )}
≡    (7) 
Especially, note that if     ′(  )    (  )   , then   
′( ) is always positive. In 
other words, as long as the production function from the inherited debt is elastic, 
higher the inherited debt level is, higher the investment in the first period is made. 
This is different from the traditional debt overhang effect, which represents the 
situation which the inherited debt stock always has a negative effect on debtor 
country’s investment. 
To see how the inherited debt stock affect the debtor country’s default 
probability,  ( ), differentiate default probability with respect to  , taking account 
of dependent of    on  . 
 
  [
  ∫  ( )  
𝐴
 
𝜂𝐹 (  )𝐹0(𝛿 )
] 
  ′( )  
 
 (
 
   (  ) 0(  )
)
𝜂
[
𝐹 (  )𝐹0(𝛿 )  {  
 ( )𝐹0(𝛿 ) 𝛿𝐹 (  )}
{𝐹 (  )} {𝐹0(𝛿 )} 
]  
(8) 
Since all the term except for the numerator of the second term is positive, the sign of 
 ′( ) is that of the numerator. Thus, 
 ′( )    if   
𝐹 (  )𝐹0(𝛿 )
  
 ( )𝐹0(𝛿 ) 𝛿𝐹 (  )
≡   ,  
where   
′( )    & 
  
 ( )
𝛿
 
𝐹 (  )
𝐹0(𝛿 )
 
(9) 
 ′( )    if   
𝐹 (  )𝐹0(𝛿 )
  
 ( )𝐹0(𝛿 ) 𝛿𝐹 (  )
≡   ,  
where 
  
 ( )
𝛿
 
𝐹 (  )
𝐹0(𝛿 )
 or   
′( )    
(10) 
Define the debt stock    is such that 
  
 ( )
𝛿
 
𝐹 (  )
𝐹0(𝛿 )
. From (5),  
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  ≡
𝛿{𝐹0′(𝛿 ) 
  (  )
 0(  )
}
 (
 
   (  ) 0(  )
)  
 (  ){ 0(  )    0 (  )}
 {  (  )}
  0(  )
  (11) 
Combining (6), (7), (9), (10), and (11), the condition for decreasing default 
probability is following. The debt stock effect on the default probability is illustrated 
in Figure 2-2. 
 ′( )    if 
𝐹 (  )𝐹0(𝛿 )
  
 ( )𝐹0(𝛿 ) 𝛿𝐹 (  )
   
𝐹0′(𝛿 )𝛿𝜂{𝐹 (  )}
 𝐹0(𝛿 )
𝐹 ′(  ) (
 
   (  ) 0(  )
){𝛿 𝐹0′(𝛿 ) 𝐹0(𝛿 )}
  
(12) 
 
 
3.2. Numerical Analysis 
𝐾  
𝐷 
𝜋𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 
𝐷  𝐷  𝐷  0 
Figure 2-2: Default Probability in response to Debt Stock 
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Before moving on to the empirical analysis, the numerical analysis is 
conducted on the specific functional forms and the parameter values.  
 
<Case 1> Uniform Distribution 
The probability distribution of the productivity shock,  , is assumed to 
uniformly distributed over [   ] with mean       , for simplicity. Therefore, 
     . (Please see Table 2-1 for the functional forms and Table 2-2 for the 
parameter values.) 
 
Table 2-1: Functional Forms for Uniform Distribution Case 
  (  )      (  )    (  )
  
  (  ( )) (  )
  
 
Table 2-2: Parameter Values for Uniform Distribution Case 
   1 
   2 
   -1 
  0.8 
  0.5 
  0.9 
  2 
  0 
 
Then, the default probability,  ( ), takes the following form; 
 ( )  ∫  ( )  
 
𝜂𝐹 (  )𝐹0(𝛿 )
𝐴
 
   
    
 
 
    
 
 
   (  )  (  )
 (13) 
The first term of (13) is negative if    , positive if     , and zero if 
   . Thus, it takes larger values as the range of [   ] widens. At a first glance, it 
may seem weird, since the default probability can take positive values even if there is 
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no debt (i.e.  ( )   ), which implies that the country can default even if it owes no 
debt. However, it has the reasonable economic interpretation. The first term of (13) is 
the “intrinsic” default probability with which the country is burdened, due to its range 
of productivity shock (i.e. volatility of productivity.). If the country has large volatility 
of productivity (i.e. if     or    ), then it potentially bears positive default 
probability even if it owes no debt. This makes sense, because if the productivity 
shock can be negative (i.e.    ), the country must have potential default probability 
for any incremental debt. In the numerical analysis,     is assumed for simplicity. 
Thus, there is no negative productivity shock. 
Both   (  ) and   (  ) take the concave functional forms for the range of 
        . Since   (  ) is assumed to augment   (  ), it has the intercept of 1.  
The optimal investment    depends on the inherited debt stock,  , and 
  ( ) is defined such that (3) is satisfied. For the uniform distribution and the given 
functional forms, (3) becomes the following condition, which cannot be explicitly 
solved; 
  ′(  )  (  )
[   ∫   ( )  
 
𝜂𝐹 (  )𝐹0(𝛿 )
𝐴
]    
⇒ (  )
   
 
  {     (  )    (  ) }
(  )
    
 
  
4  {     (  )    (  ) } 
 
(14) 
The result of the numerical analysis is plotted in Figure 2-3.  
As can be seen, the default probability increases up to around 12.5% during 
first stage,  , then slowly but steadily declines to around 7.5% during the second 
stage,   , and finally increases again as the inherited debt stock reaches to the value 
of 2 during the third stage,   .  
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The interpretation of the non-monotonicity is as follows. For the first stage, 
the output grows slower relative to the inherited debt stock accumulation, which 
makes the default probability increase. For the second stage, the investment becomes 
productive enough to exceed the default probability increasing effect caused by the 
inherited debt stock accumulation, which makes the default probability makes 
decrease. For the third stage, the investment gets less productive due to the concavity 
of    as well as   , then the debt accumulation grows faster, which makes the 
default probability increase again. 
 
 
 
Figure 2-3: Numerical Analysis for Uniform Distribution 
 
<Case 2> Exponential Distribution 
Exponential Distribution is assumed for the probability distribution of the 
productivity shock,  , with mean       , for simplicity. (Please see Table 2-3 for 
the functional forms and Table 2-4 for the parameter values.) 
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Table 2-3: Functional Forms for Exponential Distribution Case 
  (  )    (  )
𝛾 
  (  ( )) (  )
  
 
Table 2-4: Parameter Values for Exponential Distribution Case 
   1 
γ 0.9 
  0.8 
  0.5 
  0.9 
 
Then, the default probability,  ( ), takes the following form; 
 ( )  ∫  ( )  
 
𝜂𝐹 (  )𝐹0(𝛿 )
 
    
 (
 
𝜂𝐹 (  )𝐹0(𝛿 )
)
 (15) 
Both   (  ) and   (  ) take the concave functional forms. Since   (  ) 
is assumed to augment   (  ), it has the intercept of 1.  
The optimal investment    depends on the inherited debt stock,  , and 
  ( ) is defined such that (3) is satisfied; 
⇒   ′(  )  (  ) [   {   
 (
 
𝜂𝐹 (  )𝐹0(𝛿 )
)
 (  
 
   (  )  (  )
)}]    (16) 
The result of the numerical analysis is plotted in Figure 2-4.  
As can be seen, the default probability increases up to more than 70% during 
first stage,  , then slowly but steadily declines to around 50% during the second 
stage,   , and finally increases again during the third stage,   .  
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Figure 2-4: Numerical Analysis for Exponential Distribution 
 
<Case 3> Log-Normal Distribution 
Log-Normal Distribution is assumed for the probability distribution of the 
productivity shock,  , with mean       , for simplicity. (Please see Table 2-5 for 
the functional forms and Table 2-6 for the parameter values.) 
 
Table 2-5: Functional Forms for Log-Normal Distribution Case 
  (  )        (  ) 
  (  ( )) (  )
  
 
Table 2-6: Parameter Values for Log-Normal Distribution Case 
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Then, the default probability,  ( ), takes the following form. Although there 
is no closed form solution, it can be expressed with error function,    . 
 ( )  ∫  ( )  
 
𝜂𝐹 (  )𝐹0(𝛿 )
 
 
 
 
 [     (
  (
 
   (  )  (  )
)  𝜇
√ 𝜎 
)] (17) 
Both   (  ) and   (  ) are takes the concave functional forms.  
The optimal investment    depends on the inherited debt stock,  , and 
  ( ) is defined such that (3) is satisfied; 
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The result of the numerical analysis is plotted in Figure 2-5.  
As can be seen, the default probability increases up to 97% during first 
stage,  , then suddenly declines to around 88% during the second stage,   , and 
finally and steadily increases again during the third stage,   .  
Both the exponential distribution and the log-normal distribution exhibits 
higher default probability than the uniform distribution. This is because both the 
exponential distribution and the log-normal distribution is skewed to left tail, which 
indicates that smaller productivity shock is more likely to happen. Therefore, both 
probability distributions’ case exhibits higher default probability. 
 
 
 
Figure 2-5: Numerical Analysis for Log-Normal Distribution 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
Following the standard sovereign default study, the Panel Logit / Probit 
Model are applied. The data set covers 129 of low-income / middle income countries 
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(definition based on the World Bank) for the period 1970-2011. 
The dependent variable is the categorical variable of default or not. The 
definition of default is the central to the sovereign default study, but it varies in the 
preceding literatures. They can be roughly categorized into three approaches. (See 
Pescatori and Sy (2007) for a overview of definition of default.) First approach is to 
list up the case studies and anecdotal episodes of default events in history. (See 
Reinhart (2010) for a comprehensive and detailed overview of default in country-by-
country samples.) Second approach applies a quantitative definition. For instance, 
Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2001) define a country to be in a debt crisis if the 
country has arrears on external obligations toward commercial creditors in excess of 5 
percent of commercial debt outstanding or has a rescheduling or restructuring 
agreement with commercial creditors. Sy (2004) defines debt crises as sovereign bond 
distress events, and suggests that sovereign bonds are distressed securities when bond 
spreads are trading 1,000 bps or more above U.S. Treasury securities, since the author 
argues that in practice, the 1,000 bps mark for spreads is often considered a 
psychological barrier by market participants. Third approach uses the rating defined 
by the rating agencies. All in all, there is no widely accepted consensus on how to 
define a sovereign default.  
The standard three approaches do not fit to the low income countries’ default. 
First approach does not work well, since the low income countries typically 
experience serial defaults, and some of them experience even “overlapping” defaults, 
in which the countries fall into another default before they settle the previous default 
with the creditors, which makes it difficult to separate one default episode from 
another. Second approach may causes selection bias problem. Third approach is not 
applicable to the low income countries, since only one-quarter of the low income 
countries have been rated by at least one of the three major agencies (Standard & 
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Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch).  
IMF and the World Bank (2012) focuses on three indicators related to 
exceptional external financing to signal whether a country is experiencing debt 
distress: (i) the accumulation of arrears on public and publicly guaranteed external 
debt in excess of five percent of the public and publicly guaranteed external debt stock 
outstanding; (ii) a rescheduling of obligations due to Paris Club creditors; or (iii) the 
disbursement by the IMF of General Resources Account resources exceeding 50 
percent of IMF quota. A debt distress episode is defined as a period lasting three or 
more years in which at least one distress signal is observed. The World Bank and 
IMF’s definition is a mixture of the first and second approach mentioned above, and 
thus bears the same problems as above. 
Here I use the following two simple definitions; 
(i) default is defined as the situation if the arrears are increasing from the 
previous year. Total number of events is 806 for Low-Income Countries. 
(ii) default(serial) is defined as the situation if the arrears are increasing more 
than two consecutive years. This eliminates the possibility of “technical delay” 
of repayment. The number of default events is 538 for Low-Income Countries. 
Thus, the definition applied here is simplistic but can capture the sovereign 
defaults in a broad sense. The weakness of my definition is supposed to be its 
sensitivity to the international donors’ assistance from abroad, since the non-default 
(i.e. no increases of the arrears) might be simply the result of the external assistance 
inflow. Thus, the external assistance variable is important control variable. It is 
necessary to bear this point in mind when interpreting the derived results.  
For the explanatory variables, the variable of interest is the debt stock 
variable. Here the external debt stock (% of GDP) and (% of export) are applied, since 
these are the variables used in the World Bank’s Debt Sustainability Framework. It 
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should be noted that the external debt stock is transformed into the net present value 
term, as the World Bank’s Debt Sustainability Framework use the net present value 
term. But since loan-by-loan data is not publicly available, the net present value 
calculation is only an approximation. In order to capture the non-monotonicity, the 
original, quadratic, and cubic terms of the external debt stock enters the estimated 
equation, with the positive, negative, and positive expected sign, respectively. 
When considering the debt stock, the domestic debt, rather than the external 
debt, is becoming an issue of significance. IMF and the World Bank (2012) pointed 
out that since 2005 the share of domestic public debt in total public debt has increased 
from 19 percent to 29 percent on average across all the low income countries. 
However, this derives largely from external debt relief and the domestic debt among 
total public debt rises relatively. In fact, domestic debt as a ratio to GDP has remained 
flat at the level of 10-15% level on average since 2000. (See Figure 2-6.) Therefore, in 
the following empirical analyses, the domestic debt is not incorporated.  
 
 
Source: IMF and the World Bank (2012) 
 
Figure 2-6: Domestic Debt to Total Public Debt and to GDP 
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Other control variables are taken from the standard sovereign default studies. 
The debt service ratio is supposed to capture the flow aspect of the country’s debt 
burden, while the variable of interest, the external debt stock, captures the stock aspect. 
The foreign direct investment and workers’ remittance are included to reflect the 
diverse financial inflow to the low income countries, and to control their impact on 
sovereign default. The GDP growth, the inflation rate, the total reserves are supposed 
to represent the country’s economic fundamentals. The government final consumption 
expenditure ratio, which includes all government current expenditures, is included to 
reflect the government’s efficiency of public expenditure. Thus, it would be a proxy of 
 , which is the efficiency measure of public investment described in the theoretical 
model. Thus, the economic downturn or turmoil would be captured by these variables. 
The previous studies emphasize that it is not only the total volume of the debt but its 
composition, especially the short-term debt ratio, is critical to the defaults. The 
dummy variable of the low income countries is included to recognize whether the 
sovereign defaults of the low income countries are different from emerging economies. 
In addition, the official creditors’ commitment is included, in order to control their, 
presumably negative, impact on the default probability. 
 
4.1. Main Results 
The results are summarized in Table 2-7.  
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Table 2-7: Estimation Results for External Debt Stock (% of GDP) 
                        
Logit Probit 
Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model Random Effect Model 
default default (serial) default default (serial) default default (serial) 
External Debt Stock 
(% of GDP) 
0.056 
[0.000]*** 
0.063 
[0.000]*** 
0.060 
[0.000]*** 
0.062 
[0.000]*** 
0.036 
[0.000]*** 
0.039 
[0.000]*** 
External Debt Stock (quadratic) 
(% of GDP) 
-0.0004 
[0.002]*** 
-0.0004 
[0.001]*** 
-0.0005 
[0.000]*** 
-0.0005 
[0.000]*** 
-0.0003 
[0.000]*** 
-0.0003 
[0.000]*** 
External Debt Stock (cubic) 
(% of GDP) 
1.18e-06 
[0.017]** 
1.09e-6 
[0.012]** 
1.31e-06 
[0.006]*** 
1.12e-06 
[0.005]*** 
7.77e-07 
[0.005]*** 
6.96e-07 
[0.002]*** 
Debt Service Ratio 
(% of export) 
-0.001 
[0.829] 
-0.003 
[0.684] 
-0.006 
[0.286] 
-0.009 
[0.148] 
-0.003 
[0.323] 
-0.005 
[0.217] 
GDP growth 
(annual %) 
-0.025 
[0.0014]** 
-0.038 
[0.000]*** 
-0.028 
[0.006]*** 
-0.040 
[0.000]*** 
-0.016 
[0.005]*** 
-0.024 
[0.000]*** 
Inflation Rate, GDP deflator 
(annual %) 
0.001 
[0.081]* 
0.0003 
[0.224] 
0.001 
[0.080]* 
0.0003 
[0.212] 
0.001 
[0.056]* 
0.0002 
[0.180] 
Short-term debt 
(% of total external debt) 
0.017 
[0.010]** 
0.031 
[0.000]*** 
0.010 
[0.085]* 
0.019 
[0.003]*** 
0.006 
[0.084]* 
0.012 
[0.002]*** 
Total Reserve 
(% of total external debt) 
-0.0003 
[0.676] 
-0.0003 
[0.831] 
-0.001 
[0.350] 
-0.003 
[0.173] 
-0.001 
[0.349] 
-0.0003 
[0.547] 
LIC 
(1=Low Income Countries ) 
-0.544 
[0.008]** 
-0.715 
[0.001]*** 
-0.139 
[0.412] 
-0.214 
[0.237] 
-0.078 
[0.444] 
-0.115 
[0.279] 
Official Creditors’ Commitment 
(million USD) 
-0.0002 
[0.019]** 
-0.0002 
[0.109] 
-0.0003 
[0.000]*** 
-0.0003 
[0.001]*** 
-0.0001 
[0.000]*** 
-0.0002 
[0.000]*** 
Foreign Direct Investment 
(% of GDP) 
-0.043 
[0.003]*** 
-0.065 
[0.000]*** 
-0.044 
[0.001]*** 
-0.059 
[0.000]*** 
-0.027 
[0.001]*** 
-0.036 
[0.000]*** 
Remittance 
(% of GDP) 
-0.007 
[0.628] 
-0.048 
[0.008]*** 
-0.008 
[0.404] 
-0.029 
[0.022]** 
-0.005 
[0.396] 
-0.017 
[0.020]** 
Government Expenditure 
(% of GDP) 
-0.006 
[0.670] 
-0.019 
[0.186] 
0.005 
[0.676] 
-0.003 
[0.809] 
0.003 
[0.650] 
-0.002 
[0.760] 
observation 2,324 2,161 2,516 2,507 2,516 2,507 
Hausman test 
(    Random-Effect Model is correct.) 
19.68 
[0.073]* 
42.57 
[0.000]*** 
- - - - 
Default Probability 
Decreasing Zone 
97 – 164% 97 – 195% 89 – 170% 99 – 185% 90 –173% 99 – 187% 
Note:  p-value is reported in [ ] and *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
 
The findings are basically common across the models, Logit, Probit. The 
main finding is the stock-related variables, External Debt Stock (% of GDP), are 
statistically significant with expected signs for each in original, quadratic and cubic 
terms. The relationship between estimated default probability and external debt stock 
is plotted in Figure 2-7 through Figure 2-12 which is implying that there is a non-
monotonic relationship between debt stock and default probability. Adding the 
quadratic and the cubic terms of the external debt stock is somewhat arbitrary. 
However, both the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) and the Schwarz Bayesian 
Information Criteria (SBIC) return the better scores for adding the quadratic and the 
cubic than without adding any or adding higher terms. 
Among the other control variables, the GDP growth enters with negative sign 
with statistical significance at all models. Thus, higher economic growth seems to 
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reduce the default probability. On the other hand, the short-term debt has the positive 
sign with statistical significance in all models. The dummy variable of the low income 
countries is statistically significant only for the fixed effect model, but it has the 
negative sign in all models explored, which indicates that the low income countries 
have relative low default probability.  The official creditors’ commitment has the 
expected negative sign, and is statistically significant in most of the models. Foreign 
direct investment enters with negative signs with statistical significance in all models, 
and the workers’ remittance also presents similar results. Thus, both the foreign direct 
investment and remittance inflow reduces the default probability. The government 
expenditure does not have statistical significance in any models, therefore it would be 
necessary to explore other variables to be a proxy for public expenditure efficiency. 
The estimated default probability decreasing zone is located at the range of 
89-195% of the external debt stock % of GDP. This seems significantly high, 
comparing to the threshold of the World Bank’s Debt Sustainability Framework, such 
as 40% for the Medium strength policy country. 
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Figure 2-7: External Debt % of GDP 
(Dependent Variable: default 
Model: Logit Fixed-Effect) 
Figure 2-8: External Debt % of GDP 
(Dependent Variable: default(serial) 
Model: Logit Fixed-Effect) 
Figure 2-9: External Debt % of GDP 
(Dependent Variable: default 
Model: Logit Random-Effect) 
Figure 2-10: External Debt % of GDP 
(Dependent Variable: default(serial) 
Model: Logit Random-Effect) 
Figure 2-11: External Debt % of GDP 
(Dependent Variable: default 
Model: Probit Random-Effect) 
Figure 2-12: External Debt % of GDP 
(Dependent Variable: default(serial) 
Model: Probit Random-Effect) 
Note: The red reference line (40%) is the World Bank’s Debt Sustainability 
Framework’s threshold for Medium policy country. 
 
Table 2-8 explores the sensitivity of the results by using the export, instead of 
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GDP, as a denominator of External Debt Stock measures.  
 
Table 2-8: Estimation Results for External Debt Stock (% of Export) 
                               
Logit    Probit  
Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model Random Effect Model 
default default (serial) default default (serial) default default (serial) 
External Debt Stock 
(% of export) 
0.018 
[0.000]*** 
0.018 
[0.000]*** 
0.018 
[0.000]*** 
0.018 
[0.000]*** 
0.011 
[0.000]*** 
0.011 
[0.000]*** 
External Debt Stock (quadratic) 
(% of export) 
-3.67e-05 
[0.000]*** 
-3.52e-05 
[0.000]*** 
-3.70e-05 
[0.000]*** 
-3.52e-05 
[0.000]*** 
-2.22e-05 
[0.000]*** 
-2.21e-05 
[0.000]*** 
External Debt Stock (cubic) 
(% of export) 
2.22e-08 
[0.001]*** 
2.07e-8 
[0.003]*** 
2.27e-08 
[0.001]*** 
2.10e-08 
[0.002]*** 
1.35e-08 
[0.001]*** 
1.32e-08 
[0.001]*** 
Debt Service Ratio 
(% of export) 
-0.012 
[0.098]* 
-0.014 
[0.060]* 
-0.018 
[0.008]*** 
-0.021 
[0.003]*** 
-0.011 
[0.007]*** 
-0.012 
[0.004]*** 
GDP growth 
(annual %) 
-0.018 
[0.072]* 
-0.031 
[0.004]*** 
-0.022 
[0.030]** 
-0.035 
[0.001]*** 
-0.013 
[0.026]** 
-0.021 
[0.001]*** 
Inflation Rate, GDP deflator 
(annual %) 
0.001 
[0.093]* 
0.0003 
[0.245] 
0.001 
[0.111] 
0.0002 
[0.263] 
0.0005 
[0.097]* 
0.0001 
[0.224] 
Short-term debt 
(% of total external debt) 
0.015 
[0.016]** 
0.029 
[0.000]*** 
0.009 
[0.133] 
0.018 
[0.005]*** 
0.005 
[0.150] 
0.010 
[0.006]*** 
Total Reserve 
(% of total external debt) 
-0.0001 
[0.919] 
0.00003 
[0.980] 
-0.001 
[0.451] 
-0.002 
[0.329] 
-0.0003 
[0.486] 
-0.0002 
[0.673] 
LIC 
(1=Low Income Countries ) 
-0.544 
[0.007]*** 
-0.669 
[0.002]*** 
-0.290 
[0.087]* 
-0.383 
[0.034]** 
-0.167 
[0.098]* 
-0.213 
[0.043]** 
Official Creditor Commitment 
(million USD) 
-0.0001 
[0.054]* 
-0.0001 
[0.248] 
-0.0003 
[0.000]*** 
-0.0003 
[0.001]*** 
-0.0001 
[0.000]*** 
-0.0002 
[0.001]*** 
Foreign Direct Investment 
(% of GDP) 
-0.036 
[0.010]*** 
-0.059 
[0.000]*** 
-0.033 
[0.011]** 
-0.048 
[0.002]*** 
-0.020 
[0.010]** 
-0.029 
[0.001]*** 
Remittance 
(% of GDP) 
-0.011 
[0.422] 
-0.049 
[0.009]*** 
-0.013 
[0.198] 
-0.031 
[0.013]** 
-0.008 
[0.187] 
-0.018 
[0.010]** 
Government Expenditure 
(% of GDP) 
-0.00002 
[0.999] 
-0.014 
[0.330] 
0.016 
[0.171] 
0.008 
[0.537] 
0.010 
[0.160] 
0.005 
[0.519] 
observation 2,288 2,127 2,482 2,473 2,482 2,473 
Hausman test 
(    Random-Effect Model is correct.) 
 
85.47 
[0.000]*** 
- - - - 
Default Probability 
Decreasing Zone 
362 – 740% 418 – 716% 368 – 718% 399 – 718% 370 –726% 390 – 726% 
Note:  p-value is reported in [ ] and *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
 
It shares the common results with Table 2-7, and indicates that External Debt 
Stock (% of export) remain to be statistically significant with expected signs for each 
in original, quadratic and cubic terms. The relationship between estimated default 
probability and external debt stock is plotted in Figure 2-13 through Figure 2-18, 
which exhibits non-monotonic relationship between debt stock and default probability, 
although it is not as explicit as in Figure 2-7 through Figure 2-12. 
The estimated default probability decreasing zone is located at the range of 
362-740% of the external debt stock % of the export. Again, this is significantly high, 
comparing to the threshold of the World Bank’s Debt Sustainability Framework, such 
as 150% for the Medium strength policy country.  
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Figure 2-13: External Debt % of Export 
(Dependent Variable: default 
Model: Logit Fixed-Effect) 
Figure 2-14: External Debt % of Export 
(Dependent Variable: default(serial) 
Model: Logit Fixed-Effect) 
Figure 2-15: External Debt % of Export 
(Dependent Variable: default 
Model: Logit Random-Effect) 
Figure 2-16: External Debt % of Export 
(Dependent Variable: default(serial) 
Model: Logit Random-Effect) 
Figure 2-17: External Debt % of Export 
(Dependent Variable: default 
Model: Probit Random-Effect) 
Figure 2-18: % of Export 
(Dependent Variable: default(serial) 
Model: Probit Random-Effect) 
Note: The red reference line (150%) is the World Bank’s Debt Sustainability 
Framework’s threshold for Medium policy country. 
 
Finally, in order to take a close look at which countries are actually 
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experiencing the decreasing default probability, the estimated results are decomposed 
into Asia, Sub-Sahara Africa, and others
2
. Figure 2-19 plots the estimated default 
probability for each region by using Logit fixed-effect model. Asia is located almost 
entirely left tail of the curve, which indicates that Asia is experiencing the traditional 
monotonic relation between the debt stock and the default probability. On the other 
hand, other regions especially Sub-Sahara Africa is experiencing the non-monotonic 
relation between the debt stock and the default probability. 
 
 
Figure 2-19: Estimated Default Probability for Asia and non-Asia 
 
4.2. Robustness Check 
Table 2-9 presents the panel unit root test, based on the Augmented Dickey-
                                                 
2
 Classification is based on the World Bank’s regional classification. “Asia” is defined by the 
countries classified as East Asia and Pacific, or South Asia by the World Bank, “Sub-Sahara Africa” 
is defined by the countries classified as Sub-Sahara Africa by the World Bank. 
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Fuller test, for the debt stock variables against the null hypothesis that all panels (i.e. 
country) includes unit root. For the external debt stock % of GDP, all test scores reject 
the null, which indicates at least one panel is stationary. For the external debt stock % 
of export, all test scores reject the null. Thus, the debt stock related variables are 
assumed to be stationary enough for panel analyses. 
 
Table 2-9: Panel Unit Root Test 
 External Debt Stock (% of 
GDP) 
External Debt Stock (% of 
Export) 
Inverse Chi-Squared 292.80 
[0.039]** 
329.61 
[0.001]*** 
Inverse Normal -2.38 
[0.009]*** 
-1.67 
[0.048]** 
Inverse Logit -2.96 
[0.002]*** 
-2.92 
[0.002]*** 
Modified Inverse Chi-
Squared 
1.82 
[0.035]** 
3.56 
[0.000]*** 
Number of Panels 126 125 
Number of Lags 1 1 
Note:  p-value is reported in [ ] and *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
 
Table 2-10 presents the estimated results of robustness checks for the external 
debt stock % of GDP. Model (1) use the one-period lagged external debt stock as 
regressors instead of the current ones. The external debt stock related variables 
remains their expected sign with statistical significance. Since the external debt stock 
variables preserve their expected sign and statistical significance up to the three-period 
lag, they could be used to forecast the default for the three periods ahead. Model (2) 
relaxes the assumption on the no autocorrelation of the error term, and applies AR(1). 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs)’ large volume of debt and their eligibility to 
receive exceptionally large amount of external aid as well as debt reduction might be 
disturbing the empirical results. Thus, Model (3) presents the estimated results, 
excluding the observations of 40 HIPCs. Still, most of the external debt stock related 
variables remain their expected sign with statistical significance. Model (4) applies the 
 68 
 
dynamic model by adding the one-period lagged dependent variable into regressors. 
Though the lagged dependent variable enters with the positive and statistically 
significant coefficient, all the external debt stock related variables also remains their 
expected sign with statistical significance. 
Among the other control variables, the official creditors’ commitment has 
negative and statistically significant coefficient in all models, as it does in the original 
model. GDP growth also remains to have negative and statistically significant impact 
in most of the models.  
In summary, the external debt stock related variables maintain their statistical 
significance with expected sign for original, quadratic and cubic terms in most of the 
alternative specifications. 
  
6
9
 
Table 2-10: Robustness Checks for External Debt Stock (% of GDP) 
                        
Model (1) 
Logit Fixed Effect, 
Lagged(1) Debt Stock 
Model (2) 
AR(1) autocorrelation, 
default 
Model (3) 
Excluding HIPCs, 
default 
Model (4) 
Dynamic, 
default 
default default (serial) Logit Probit Logit, Fixed Probit Logit, Fixed Probit 
External Debt Stock 
(% of GDP) 
0.034 
[0.001]*** 
0.050 
[0.000]*** 
0.048 
[0.000]*** 
0.031 
[0.000]*** 
0.103 
[0.002]*** 
0.068 
[0.000]*** 
0.053 
[0.000]*** 
0.032 
[0.000]*** 
External Debt Stock (quadratic) 
(% of GDP) 
-3.00e-04 
[0.016]** 
-4.33e-04 
[0.002]*** 
-3.92e-04 
[0.014]** 
-2.49e-04 
[0.007]*** 
-0.001 
[0.130] 
-8.41e-04 
[0.053]* 
-4.37e-04 
[0.003]*** 
-2.83e-04 
[0.001]*** 
External Debt Stock (cubic) 
(% of GDP) 
7.91e-07 
[0.051]* 
1.08e-06 
[0.006]*** 
9.59e-07 
[0.085]* 
6.06e-07 
[0.059]* 
4.09e-06 
[0.420] 
3.30e-06 
[0.260] 
1.12e-06 
[0.021]** 
7.31e-07 
[0.007]*** 
Debt Service Ratio 
(% of export) 
0.005 
[0.368] 
0.003 
[0.688] 
-0.012 
[0.040]** 
-0.007 
[0.041]** 
-0.002 
[0.789] 
-0.004 
[0.393] 
-0.002 
[0.737] 
-0.004 
[0.247] 
GDP growth 
(annual %) 
-0.032 
[0.001]*** 
-0.047 
[0.000]*** 
-0.023 
[0.022]** 
-0.014 
[0.018]** 
-0.009 
[0.506] 
-0.008 
[0.327] 
-0.022 
[0.030]** 
-0.014 
[0.016]** 
Inflation Rate, GDP deflator 
(annual %) 
0.001 
[0.089]* 
0.0003 
[0.219] 
0.001 
[0.044]** 
0.001 
[0.029]** 
0.001 
[0.192] 
0.0004 
[0.128] 
0.001 
[0.181] 
0.0004 
[0.143] 
Short-term debt 
(% of total external debt) 
0.014 
[0.026]** 
0.029 
[0.000]*** 
0.003 
[0.562] 
0.002 
[0.581] 
0.008 
[0.288] 
0.004 
[0.390] 
0.016 
[0.012] 
0.005 
[0.141] 
Total Reserve 
(% of total external debt) 
-0.001 
[0.374] 
-0.003 
[0.215] 
-0.007 
[0.001]*** 
-0.004 
[0.001]*** 
0.0004 
[0.534] 
0.0001 
[0.715] 
-0.0004 
[0.671] 
-0.001 
[0.280] 
LIC 
(1=Low Income Countries ) 
-0.422 
[0.041]** 
-0.602 
[0.006]*** 
0.093 
[0.473] 
0.056 
[0.482] 
-0.551 
[0.083]* 
-0.208 
[0.183] 
-0.505 
[0.015]** 
-0.028 
[0.764] 
Official Creditors’ Commitment 
(million USD) 
-0.0002 
[0.021]** 
-0.0001 
[0.136] 
-0.0003 
[0.000]*** 
-0.0002 
[0.000]*** 
-0.0002 
[0.036]** 
-0.0001 
[0.004]*** 
-0.0002 
[0.023]** 
-0.0001 
[0.000]*** 
default 
Lagged (1) 
      0.444 
[0.000]*** 
0.433 
[0.000]*** 
Foreign Direct Investment 
(% of GDP) 
-0.047 
[0.001]*** 
-0.067 
[0.000]*** 
-0.022 
[0.060]* 
-0.014 
[0.049]** 
-0.034 
[0.053]* 
-0.018 
[0.070]* 
-0.038 
[0.008]*** 
-0.022 
[0.004]*** 
Remittance 
(% of GDP) 
-0.006 
[0.652] 
-0.048 
[0.009]*** 
-0.011 
[0.111] 
-0.007 
[0.083]* 
-0.015 
[0.363] 
-0.007 
[0.346] 
-0.007 
[0.644] 
-0.005 
[0.365] 
Government Expenditure 
(% of GDP) 
-0.006 
[0.689] 
-0.019 
[0.191] 
-0.001 
[0.959] 
0.0002 
[0.970] 
-0.001 
[0.971] 
0.005 
[0.655] 
-0.006 
[0.660] 
0.004 
[0.596] 
observation 2,324 2,161 2,171 2,171 1,534 1,721 2,317 2,507 
Default Probability 
Decreasing Zone 
86 – 167% 84 – 184% 93 – 180% 94 – 181% 70 – 119% 67 – 101% 94 – 166% 85 – 173% 
Note:  p-value is reported in [ ] and *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
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5. Policy Implications and Way Forward 
Two key policy implications could be derived from the results.  
Firstly, the empirical results indicate the possibility that there exist a non-
monotonic relationship between the external debt stock and the default probability, 
which remains to be significant even after controlling the external assistance related 
variables. Thus, even though the international donors’ involvement do reduce the 
default probability, the external debt stock does affect the default probability in a non-
monotonic way. Hence, it indicates the possibility that some countries may be able to 
reduce their default probability with higher debt stock, possibly through economic 
growth, than the World Bank’s Debt Sustainability Framework assumes. From this 
perspective, the current Debt Sustainability Framework is constraining the 
opportunities to grow for some countries. Considering that all Asian countries are 
located at the left side of the hump of the curve, it might be Asian countries that the 
Debt Sustainability Framework is imposing sub-optimal constraints. If this is the case, 
the Debt Sustainability Framework is the system to preserve or improve the debt 
sustainability of Sub-Sahara African countries (and others) by sacrificing the 
economic growth opportunities of Asian countries. It is understandable and reasonable 
for the World Bank, as a leading global institution, to establish the conservative 
standard, since the World Bank is in the responsible position to help the least 
developed countries as well as to sustain the stability of the global financial structure. 
However, if this sublime goal is being realized by shifting the forgone opportunities 
costs to grow onto some specific countries or regions, there seems a room to 
reconsider the system as a whole.  
On the other hand, it is also true that the non-monotonicity of default 
probability should be interpreted with careful considerations. Considering that large 
part of the predicted default events occur before the estimated default probability 
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decreasing zone, and that the level which the estimated default probability decrease is 
far beyond the threshold of the Debt Sustainability Framework, it is too reckless to 
conclude that the higher debt would be acceptable. In addition, what causes the 
geographic difference is not clear. If the non-monotonicity is indeed caused by the 
productive public capital, as developed in Section 3, the geographic difference seems 
counter-intuitive, since typically the productivity of the public capital is supposed to 
higher in Asia than in Sub-Sahara Africa.  
Second policy implication is that the empirical results indicates a moral 
hazard problem of the heavily indebted countries, since decreasing default probability 
is explained by the external assistance to some extent. Thus, the more indebted the 
countries are, the more aid they expect to receive from the international donor 
community as a bailout. Through the series of debt relief, HIPC Initiative in 1996, 
Enhanced HIPC Initiative in 1999, and most recently the Multilateral Debt Relief 
Initiative (MDRI) in 2005, the international donor community has been trying to apply 
the strict eligibility of debt relief and providing close monitoring of the economic 
management of the post-debt relief countries. The further analysis needs to be done to 
capture how these donors’ efforts affect the borrowers’ behavior. 
Since the derived empirical results heavily depend on (i) the definition of the 
sovereign default, and (ii) the functional forms of the models, there are three possible 
directions to move the research further.  
Firstly, it is necessary to construct the data set of alternative sovereign default. 
Alternative sovereign default data needs to dig into the case studies of each default 
episodes of the low income countries, with attention to separating the overlapping 
default episodes. In addition, for the HIPCs, it is necessary to take into account the 
timing that they reach the Decision Point, the Completion Point, and the MDRI’s debt 
relief. Besides, further analysis on the causality of the geographic difference is 
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necessary, in order to derive more sensible policy implications. Empirically, additional 
explanatory variables such as the quality of the public investment as well as the 
institutions and policy are necessary to control the potential geographic difference. 
Secondly, non-parametric approach should be explored to complement the 
current models. Some of the recent works use the Classification and Regression Tree 
method, which is a sort of data mining technique to pick up the most predictive 
variable through splitting entire samples into sub-trees. It does not provide the 
evidence on non-monotonicity, but it could be used to show how strong explanatory 
power the stock-related variables may have for predicting the default events.  
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APPENDIX 
APPENDIX 2-1: DATA DESCRIPTION AND SOURCES 
 
OECD, DAC (Development Assistance Committee) database on Aid, 2012. 
World Bank, 2012. Global Development Finance (GDF), Washington, D.C. 
World Bank, 2012. World Development Indicators (WDI), Washington, D.C. 
Variable Name Variable Description Data Source 
default Dummy variable which takes 1 if 
the arrears are increasing from the 
previous year 
Arrears data from 
GDF 
default (serial) Dummy variable which takes 1 if 
the arrears are increasing more 
than two consecutive years. 
Arrears data from 
GDF 
External Debt Stock 
(% of GDP) 
Net Present Value of External 
Debt Stock (% of GDP) 
GDF, 
Transformed into Net 
Present Value by 
author’s calculation 
External Debt Stock 
(% of export) 
Net Present Value of External 
Debt Stock (%of exports of 
goods, services and income) 
GDF, 
Transformed into Net 
Present Value by 
author’s calculation 
Debt Service Ratio 
(% of export) 
Debt Service (% of exports of 
goods, services and income) 
GDF 
GDP growth (annual %) GDP growth rate (annual %) WDI 
Inflation Rate Inflation, GDP deflator 
(annual %) 
WDI 
Short-term debt 
(% of total external debt) 
Short-term debt (% of total 
external debt) 
WDI 
Total Reserve 
(% of total external debt) 
Total Reserve (% of total external 
debt) 
WDI 
LIC Dummy variable which takes 1 if 
the country is classified as the low 
income country based on the 
World Bank’s definition 
WDI 
Official Creditors’ 
Commitment 
(million USD) 
Amount of long-term from 
official creditors including loans 
from international organizations 
(multilateral loans) and loans 
from governments (bilateral loans, 
official export credits).  
GDF 
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APPENDIX 2-2: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 Entire Samples 
default 0.45 0.50 0 1 
default (serial) 0.29 0.45 0 1 
External Debt Stock (% of 
GDP) 
29.02 35.51 0 627.44 
External Debt Stock (% of 
Export) 
128.72 208.44 0 3,737.67 
Debt Service Ratio 13.51 11.94 0 150.84 
GDP growth 3.77 6.55 -51.03 106.28 
Inflation Rate 60.33 612.24 -29.17 26,762.02 
Short-term debt 11.97 12.55 0 88.93 
Total Reserve 58.28 249.03 -0.17 6,517.15 
LIC 0.38 0.48 0 1 
Official Creditors’ 
Commitment 
467.61 1,075.76 0 23,206.90 
Foreign Direct Investment 3.03 5.73 -82.89 90.74 
Remittances 4.82 8.94 0.00 96.94 
Government Expenditure 14.99 6.49 1.38 69.54 
 Low Income Countries 
default 0.53 0.50 0 1 
default (serial) 0.36 0.48 0 1 
External Debt Stock (% of 
GDP) 
39.04 42.05 0 478.66 
External Debt Stock (% of 
Export) 
212.44 303.28 0 3,737.67 
Debt Service Ratio 14.11 12.99 0 150.84 
GDP growth 3.64 6.91 -50.25 106.28 
Inflation Rate 85.89 861.68 -27.05 26,762.02 
Short-term debt 7.90 9.00 0 83.15 
Total Reserve 34.51 126.46 -0.17 3,366.78 
LIC - - - - 
Official Creditors’ 
Commitment 
387.17 903.78 0 9,295.49 
Foreign Direct Investment 2.72 6.50 -28.62 90.74 
Remittances 4.60 10.11 0.001 96.94 
Government Expenditure 13.78 6.97 2.05 69.54 
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APPENDIX 2-3: SAMPLE COUNTRIES 
 
  Country World Bank’s Regional Classification World Bank’s Classification of Income Group Other 
1 Afghanistan South Asia Low income HIPC 
2 Albania Europe & Central Asia Lower middle income   
3 Algeria Middle East & North Africa Upper middle income   
4 Angola Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income   
5 Argentina Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income   
6 Armenia Europe & Central Asia Lower middle income   
7 Azerbaijan Europe & Central Asia Lower middle income   
8 Bangladesh South Asia Low income   
9 Belarus Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income   
10 Belize Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income   
11 Benin Sub-Saharan Africa Low income HIPC 
12 Bhutan South Asia Lower middle income   
13 Bolivia Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income HIPC 
14 Bosnia and Herzegovina Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income   
15 Botswana Sub-Saharan Africa Upper middle income   
16 Brazil Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income   
17 Bulgaria Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income   
18 Burkina Faso Sub-Saharan Africa Low income HIPC 
19 Burundi Sub-Saharan Africa Low income HIPC 
20 Cambodia East Asia & Pacific Low income   
21 Cameroon Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income HIPC 
22 Cape Verde Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income   
23 Central African Republic Sub-Saharan Africa Low income HIPC 
24 Chad Sub-Saharan Africa Low income HIPC 
25 Chile Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income   
26 China East Asia & Pacific Lower middle income   
27 Colombia Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income   
28 Comoros Sub-Saharan Africa Low income HIPC 
29 Congo, Dem. Rep. Sub-Saharan Africa Low income HIPC 
30 Congo, Rep. Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income HIPC 
31 Costa Rica Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income   
32 Côte d'Ivoire Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income HIPC 
33 Croatia .. High income: non-OECD   
34 Djibouti Middle East & North Africa Lower middle income   
35 Dominica Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income   
36 Dominican Republic Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income   
37 Ecuador Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income   
38 Egypt, Arab Rep. Middle East & North Africa Lower middle income   
39 El Salvador Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income   
40 Eritrea Sub-Saharan Africa Low income HIPC 
41 Ethiopia Sub-Saharan Africa Low income HIPC 
42 Fiji East Asia & Pacific Upper middle income   
43 Gabon Sub-Saharan Africa Upper middle income   
44 Gambia, The Sub-Saharan Africa Low income HIPC 
45 Georgia Europe & Central Asia Lower middle income   
46 Ghana Sub-Saharan Africa Low income HIPC 
47 Grenada Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income   
48 Guatemala Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income   
49 Guinea Sub-Saharan Africa Low income HIPC 
50 Guinea-Bissau Sub-Saharan Africa Low income HIPC 
51 Guyana Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income HIPC 
52 Haiti Latin America & Caribbean Low income HIPC 
53 Honduras Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income HIPC 
54 India South Asia Lower middle income   
55 Indonesia East Asia & Pacific Lower middle income   
56 Iran, Islamic Rep. Middle East & North Africa Lower middle income   
57 Jamaica Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income   
58 Jordan Middle East & North Africa Lower middle income   
59 Kazakhstan Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income   
60 Kenya Sub-Saharan Africa Low income   
61 Kyrgyz Republic Europe & Central Asia Low income HIPC 
62 Lao PDR East Asia & Pacific Low income   
63 Latvia Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income   
64 Lebanon Middle East & North Africa Upper middle income   
65 Lesotho Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income   
66 Liberia Sub-Saharan Africa Low income HIPC 
67 Macedonia, FYR Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income   
68 Madagascar Sub-Saharan Africa Low income HIPC 
69 Malawi Sub-Saharan Africa Low income HIPC 
70 Malaysia East Asia & Pacific Upper middle income   
71 Maldives South Asia Lower middle income   
72 Mali Sub-Saharan Africa Low income HIPC 
73 Mauritania Sub-Saharan Africa Low income HIPC 
74 Mauritius Sub-Saharan Africa Upper middle income   
75 Mexico Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income   
76 Moldova Europe & Central Asia Lower middle income   
77 Mongolia East Asia & Pacific Lower middle income   
78 Montenegro Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income   
79 Morocco Middle East & North Africa Lower middle income   
80 Mozambique Sub-Saharan Africa Low income HIPC 
81 Myanmar East Asia & Pacific Low income   
82 Nepal South Asia Low income   
83 Nicaragua Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income HIPC 
84 Niger Sub-Saharan Africa Low income HIPC 
85 Nigeria Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income   
86 Pakistan South Asia Lower middle income   
87 Panama Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income   
88 Papua New Guinea East Asia & Pacific Lower middle income   
89 Paraguay Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income   
90 Peru Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income   
91 Philippines East Asia & Pacific Lower middle income   
92 Poland Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income   
93 Romania Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income   
94 Russian Federation Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income   
95 Rwanda Sub-Saharan Africa Low income HIPC 
96 Samoa East Asia & Pacific Lower middle income   
97 São Tomé and Principe Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income HIPC 
98 Senegal Sub-Saharan Africa Low income HIPC 
99 Serbia Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income   
100 Seychelles Sub-Saharan Africa Upper middle income   
101 Sierra Leone Sub-Saharan Africa Low income HIPC 
102 Solomon Islands East Asia & Pacific Lower middle income   
103 Somalia Sub-Saharan Africa Low income HIPC 
104 South Africa Sub-Saharan Africa Upper middle income   
105 Sri Lanka South Asia Lower middle income   
106 St. Kitts and Nevis Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income   
107 St. Lucia Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income   
108 St. Vincent and the Grenadines Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income   
109 Sudan Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income HIPC 
110 Swaziland Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income   
111 Syrian Arab Republic Middle East & North Africa Lower middle income   
112 Tajikistan Europe & Central Asia Low income   
113 Tanzania Sub-Saharan Africa Low income HIPC 
114 Thailand East Asia & Pacific Lower middle income   
115 Togo Sub-Saharan Africa Low income HIPC 
116 Tonga East Asia & Pacific Lower middle income   
117 Tunisia Middle East & North Africa Lower middle income   
118 Turkey Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income   
119 Turkmenistan Europe & Central Asia Lower middle income   
120 Uganda Sub-Saharan Africa Low income HIPC 
121 Ukraine Europe & Central Asia Lower middle income   
122 Uruguay Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income   
123 Uzbekistan Europe & Central Asia Low income   
124 Vanuatu East Asia & Pacific Lower middle income   
125 Venezuela, RB Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income   
126 Vietnam East Asia & Pacific Low income   
127 Yemen, Rep. Middle East & North Africa Low income   
128 Zambia Sub-Saharan Africa Low income HIPC 
129 Zimbabwe Sub-Saharan Africa Low income   
Note: Income classifications are in effect until 1 July 2010
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CHAPTER 3 
DYNAMIC GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS 
ON THE WORLD BANK’S TRAFFIC LIGHT SYSTEM 
 
1. Introduction 
In 2004, the World Bank (IDA) introduced the Debt Sustainability 
Framework (DSF) for low-income countries, so called “traffic light system”, based on 
which IDA determines the grant/loan ratio to be allocated to each recipient country for 
each fiscal year. For instance, the country receives 100% grant aid, if the country is 
classified as “red light” (i.e. its debt level is unsustainable), under the traffic light 
system. The World Bank and IMF have been requesting the other institutions (aid 
donors, export credit agencies and private lenders) to comply with this system, in 
order to maintain developing countries’ debt sustainability and to avoid another debt 
crises. 
As suggested by the empirical results of the chapter 2, the current thresholds 
for external borrowing under the traffic light system could be sub-optimal for some 
countries with high potential to achieve economic growth by utilizing debt-financed 
investment. If this is the case, the traffic light system might be unduly constraining the 
ability of developing countries to finance their development goals. This leads to the 
motivation of this paper. 
The compositional change of the traffic lights is summarized in Figure 3-1. In 
FY2005, “red” light countries were more than half of total IDA-only countries, but 
have been declining year by year. In FY2013, “red” light countries are one third of 
IDA-only countries. The frequency of the traffic light’s change is summarized in 
Table 3-1. Although the traffic light becomes relatively stable, especially after 
introducing three year moving average Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 
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(CPIA) index in FY2008, around ten countries per year face up with the traffic light’s 
change. Figure 3-2 shows some of the extreme cases; Nepal and Djibouti. Considering 
that neither of them are Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) and thus are not 
affected by debt reduction, its traffic light’s volatility stems, not from the debt stock 
change but from the institutional problems with the traffic light system. 
 
Table 3-1: Change of Traffic Lights 
 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 
Countries with 
Changed Traffic Light 
16 19 11 7 5 7 9 8 
IDA-only Countries 66 66 65 64 64 63 64 64 
 
 
 
Figure 3-1: Compositional Change of Traffic Lights 
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<Example 1: Nepal> 
FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 
         
 
<Example 2: Djibouti> 
FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 
         
 
Figure 3-2: Example of Countries with Frequent Traffic Light Changes 
 
This paper’s objective is to analyze how the traffic light system affects the 
dynamic general equilibrium of the recipient countries. My hypothesis is that the 
traffic light system leads to (i) binding budget constraint, and (ii) volatility of aid 
inflow (in terms of both the volume as well as the grant ratio), both of which 
eventually reduces the recipient countries’ long-term growth. 
This paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the related 
literatures and provides a general direction of detailed analysis. The third section 
describes the theoretical model. The fourth section presents the numerical analysis. 
The last section provides some policy implications and way forward. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Public investment, especially infrastructure investment, has been widely 
recognized as the important factor of economic growth for the developing countries, 
and thus their governments have been putting enormous efforts on infrastructure 
development. As described in the World Bank (1994), infrastructure in low- and 
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middle-income countries typically represents about 20% of total investment and 40-
60% of public investment, and nearly half of all public investment in infrastructure is 
underwritten by the donor financing. Thus, (i) the economic growth, (ii) the public 
investment, and (iii) the external financing by the foreign donors are closely 
interrelated in the developing countries.  
There are two relevant strands of the past works on the above-mentioned 
interrelation. First strand focus on the link between the economic growth and the 
public investment. The theoretical foundations of the role of public capital on private 
capital accumulation and economic growth date back to the seminal paper of Arrow 
and Kurz (1970). The subsequent works, such as Aschauer (1989a, 1989b), seek to 
demonstrate that publicly provided capital should enter as a complementary input to 
private production. Barro (1990) develops a model of endogenous growth in which the 
government uses tax revenue to finance government expenditure and this expenditure 
(i.e. public investment) enters into the production function as a productive input. 
While his model essentially reduces to a version of the “AK model” in which there are 
no transitional dynamics, Futagami et al. (1993) develops an endogenous growth 
model with productive public capital along with private capital in a spirit similar to 
that of Barro (1990) but with a transitional dynamics. Most of these previous 
literatures use the domestic tax revenue, instead of the external financing, as a fiscal 
source of public investment. 
Second strand examines the link between the economic growth and the 
external financing, especially the foreign aid. Large volume of past works have been 
done, especially on the presumably positive impact of the official aid on the economic 
growth of the developing countries. One of the recent trend in this field focus on the 
aid volatility and predictability. Bulir and Hamann (2003) examines empirical 
evidence on the volatility and uncertainty of aid flows. One of their findings is that aid 
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is found to be more volatile than fiscal revenues and that uncertainty about aid 
disbursement is large. Arellano, Bulir, Lane and Lipschitz (2008) examine the effects 
of aid and its volatility on consumption, investment, and the structure of production in 
the context of an intertemporal two-sector general equilibrium model, calibrated using 
data for aid-dependent countries in Africa. One of their findings is that aid volatility 
results in substantial welfare losses, providing a motivation for a recent discussion of 
aid architecture stressing the need for greater predictability. Peiris and Saxegaard 
(2007) evaluate monetary policy-tradeoffs in low-income countries using a dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model estimated on data for Mozambique 
taking into account the sources of major exogenous shocks, and level of financial 
development. One of their findings is that the aid leads to an increase in the demand 
for non-tradable goods as well as imports. As a result of the former there is an increase 
in labor as well as GDP, while the increased demand for imports leads to a 
deterioration in the trade balance. 
Until recently there are limited attempts to incorporate all three factors, (i) the 
economic growth, (ii) the public investment, and (iii) the external financing, into one 
model with a view to apply to the low income countries. The Gleneagles G8 Summit 
in 2005 accelerate the necessity of the extensive research in this area, since one of its 
outcomes is scaling-up of aid, with further debt cancellation, to Africa. Since then, 
work is underway to construct formal general equilibrium model for the low income 
countries to assess the complex interlinkages among the macroeconomic impact of 
large aid inflow, public investment, and growth. Chatterjee, Sakoulis and Turnovsky 
(2003) analyze the effects of grant aid, which is tied to public infrastructure 
(productive public expenditure), on economic growth and welfare. One of their 
findings is that those kind of aid generates dynamic adjustments, as public capital 
accumulated in the recipient country. Agenor and Yilmaz (2008) develops the model 
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based on productive public capital, and examine how the permanent and temporary 
increase of aid affects the growth and the welfare of the typical low income countries. 
Berg et al. (2010) develops a New-Keynesian model for Uganda and examine how 
different fiscal and monetary policies can affect the “spending” and “absorption” of 
aid. Buffie et al. (2012) develops a model to study the macroeconomics effects of 
public investment surges in low-income countries, making explicit: (i) the investment-
growth linkages, (ii) public external and domestic debt accumulation, (iii) the fiscal 
policy reactions necessary to ensure debt-sustainability, and (iv) the macroeconomic 
adjustment required to ensure internal and external balance.  
This paper shares the similar motivation with the above-mentioned continuing 
works to analyze the growth – public investment nexus underpinning the World 
Bank’s Debt Sustainability Framework.  
 
3. Theoretical Model 
The theoretical model is constructed by incorporating “productive public 
expenditure”, which is financed by domestic financing and external grant/loan aid, 
into the dynamic general equilibrium. I consider a small open economy populated by 
an infinitely lived representative agent who produces and consumes a single traded 
commodity. 
 
3.1. Private Sector 
Output of the commodity is produced by the constant returns to scale 
production function; 
   (
  
 𝑃
)
𝜂
 𝑃     
𝜂
 𝑃
  𝜂
                   (1) 
where 
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   output 
    public capital stock 
 𝑃  private capital stock 
Thus, equation (1) assumes that the public capital stock enhances the 
productivity of private capital stock. 
The agent consumes this good, yielding utility over an infinite horizon 
represented by the isoelastic utility function;  
 ≡ ∫
 
𝛾
 𝛾  𝛽   
∞
 
         ∞  𝛾    (2) 
where 
   consumption 
The agent accumulates its private capital, with expenditure on a given change 
in the private capital stock, involving adjustment (installation) costs specified by the 
quadratic function; 
𝛹𝑃( 𝑃  𝑃)   𝑃   𝑃
 𝑃
 
  𝑃
  𝑃 (  
 𝑃
 
 𝑃
 𝑃
) (3) 
where 
 𝑃  change in private capital stock (new private capital investment) 
The net rate of private capital accumulation is defined as; 
 ?̇?   𝑃   𝑃 𝑃 (4) 
where 
 𝑃  depreciation rate of private capital 
The agent can borrow from international credit market, and its cost of 
borrowing depends on its creditworthiness of the economy. The international credit 
market is assumed to assess the economy’s ability to repay and default risk by the 
country’s debt-capital (equity) ratio. Therefore, the interest rate, which the county is 
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charged, increases with the debt-capital ratio, which leads to upward-sloping supply 
schedule of debt; 
 (
 
 
)   ∗  𝜔 (
 
 
)    𝜔′    (5) 
where 
   national debt stock (  𝑃    ) 
 ∗  exogenously given world interest rate 
   national capital stock (  𝑃    ) 
𝜔 (
 
 
)  country-specific borrowing premium that increases with national debt-
capital ratio 
It should be noted that the agent takes the interest rate, equation (5), as given, 
since it is a function of the country’s aggregate (i.e. national) debt-capital ratio, which 
the agent is assumed to be unable to influence.  
The agent’s decision problem is to choose his rates of consumption,  , 
private investment,  𝑃, and accumulation of private debt,  𝑃, as well as private 
capital,  𝑃, to maximize the intertemporal utility, equation (2), subject to the flow 
budget constraint; 
 ?̇?     (
 
 
) 𝑃  𝛹𝑃( 𝑃  𝑃)  (  𝜏)  𝑇 (6) 
where 
 𝑃  private debt stock 
𝜏  income tax 
𝑇  lump-sum tax 
The discounted Hamiltonian for this dynamic optimization is; 
𝐻 ≡   𝛽 
 
𝛾
 𝛾  
 𝜇 [   (
 
 
) 𝑃  𝛹𝑃( 𝑃  𝑃)  (  𝜏)  𝑇]  𝜇   𝑃   𝑃 𝑃  
(7) 
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𝐻    𝛽 [
 
𝛾
 𝛾  𝜇  
𝛽 [   (
 
 
) 𝑃  𝛹𝑃( 𝑃  𝑃)  (  𝜏)  𝑇]
 𝜇  
𝛽   𝑃   𝑃 𝑃 ] 
where 
𝜇   discounted shadow value of wealth (i.e. negative of debt) in the form of 
internationally traded bonds 
𝜇   discounted shadow value of agent’s private capital stock 
Define the current-value multiplier as; 
𝑣  𝜇  
𝛽   current shadow value of wealth in the form of internationally traded 
bonds 
𝑞′  𝜇  
𝛽   current shadow value of agent’s private capital stock 
Define also the current value Hamiltonian, 𝐻∗; 
𝐻∗   𝛽 𝐻  
 
𝛾
 𝛾  𝑣 [   (
 
 
) 𝑃  𝛹𝑃( 𝑃  𝑃)  (  𝜏)  𝑇]
 𝑞′  𝑃   𝑃 𝑃  
(8) 
Pontryagin’s principle indicates that maximization of the Hamiltonian by 
choice of   and  𝑃 sequence leads to optimality conditions; 
𝜕𝐻
𝜕 
    →    𝛾   𝑣 
(9) 
𝜕𝐻
𝜕 𝑃
    →     𝑃
 𝑃
 𝑃
 𝑞 
(10) 
where 
𝑞  
𝑞′
𝑣
  market price of private capital in terms of price of foreign bonds 
Equation (9) equates the marginal utility of consumption to the shadow value 
of wealth, while equation (10) equates the marginal cost of an additional unit of 
investment, which is inclusive of the marginal installation cost,  𝑃
  
  
, to the market 
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value of capital. Equation (10), combined with equation (4), leads to the following 
expression for the rate of private capital accumulation; 
 ?̇?
 𝑃
≡ 𝜙𝑃  
𝑞   
 𝑃
  𝑃 (11) 
Applying the standard optimality conditions with respect to  𝑃 and  𝑃 
implies the usual arbitrage relationships, equating the rates of return on consumption 
and investment in private capital to the costs of borrowing abroad; 
?̇?   𝑣  𝜇 ̇ 
𝛽  
?̇?   𝑣   𝛽 
𝜕𝐻
𝜕 𝑃
 
?̇?   𝑣   𝛽 𝜇  (
 
 
) 
?̇?   𝑣   𝛽 𝑣  𝛽  (
 
 
) 
?̇?   𝑣  𝑣 (
 
 
) 
→    
?̇?
𝑣
  (
 
 
) (12) 
 
𝑞′̇   𝑞′  𝜇 ̇ 
𝛽  
?̇?   𝑞′   𝛽 
𝜕𝐻
𝜕 𝑃
 
?̇?   𝑞′   𝛽 [ 𝜇 
𝜕𝛹
𝜕 𝑃
 𝜇 (  𝜏)
𝜕 
𝜕 𝑃
 𝜇  𝑃] 
?̇?   𝑞′   𝛽 [ (𝑣  𝛽 ) ( 
 𝑃 𝑃
 
  𝑃
 )  (𝑣 
 𝛽 )(  𝜏)(   )   
𝜂
 𝑃
 𝜂
 (𝑞′  𝛽 ) 𝑃] 
?̇?   𝑞′  𝑣 (
 𝑃 𝑃
 
  𝑃
 )  𝑣(  𝜏)(   )   
𝜂
 𝑃
 𝜂
 𝑞′ 𝑃 
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𝑞′̇
𝑞′
   
𝑣
𝑞′
(
 𝑃 𝑃
 
  𝑃
 )  
𝑣
𝑞′
(  𝜏)(   )   
𝜂
 𝑃
 𝜂
  𝑃 
𝑞′̇
𝑞′
   
𝑣
𝑞′
(
 𝑃 𝑃
 
  𝑃
 )  
𝑣
𝑞′
(  𝜏)(   )   
𝜂
 𝑃
 𝜂
  𝑃 
𝜕𝑞𝑣
𝜕 
𝑞𝑣
   
 
𝑞
(
 𝑃( ?̇?   𝑃 𝑃)
 
  𝑃
 )  
 
𝑞
(  𝜏)(   )   
𝜂
 𝑃
 𝜂
  𝑃 
?̇?𝑣  𝑞?̇?
𝑞𝑣
   
 
𝑞
(
 𝑃 (
𝑞   
 𝑃
 𝑃   𝑃 𝑃   𝑃 𝑃)
 
  𝑃
 ) 
 
 
𝑞
(  𝜏)(   )   
𝜂
 𝑃
 𝜂
  𝑃 
?̇?
𝑞
 
?̇?
𝑣
   
 
𝑞
(
 𝑃(
𝑞   
 𝑃
 𝑃)
 
  𝑃
 )  
 
𝑞
(  𝜏)(   )   
𝜂
 𝑃
 𝜂
  𝑃 
 
𝑞
(  𝜏)(   )   
𝜂
 𝑃
 𝜂
 
?̇?
𝑞
 
 
𝑞
(
(𝑞   ) 
  𝑃
)   𝑃    
?̇?
𝑣
 
→ 
(  𝜏)(   )   
𝜂
 𝑃
 𝜂
𝑞
 
?̇?
𝑞
 
(𝑞   ) 
  𝑝𝑞
  𝑃   (
 
 
) (13) 
Finally, in order to ensure that the agent’s intertemporal budget constraint is 
met, the following transversality conditions must hold; 
li 
 →∞
 𝑃𝑣 
 𝛽       li 
 →∞
 𝑃𝑞′ 
 𝛽    (14) 
 
3.2. Public Sector 
In addition to the private capital, the country accumulates the public capital 
as; 
     ̅  𝜆 𝐴 ln(  𝜃)    𝜆 𝐴 (  𝜃)   (15) 
where 
    change in public capital stock (new public capital investment) 
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  ̅  new public capital investment financed domestically 
   total external aid 
𝜃  grant ratio of external aid 
𝜆 𝐴, 𝜆 𝐴  degree to which each aid is tied to public capital investment  
( ≤ 𝜆 𝐴 ≤ 𝜆 𝐴 ≤  ) 
Thus, equation (15) states that the public capital investment is financed by 
two channels: domestic finance and external aid. The case 𝜆    implies that external 
aid is completely tied to pubic capital investment, representing a “productive” aid, 
while the case 𝜆    implies that external aid is not invested in public capital and 
hence represent a “pure” aid. It is to be noted that the loan aid is assumed to be more 
tied to public capital investment than the grant aid (i.e. 𝜆 𝐴 ≤ 𝜆 𝐴).  
In addition, the case 𝜃    implies that external aid is completely grant, 
while the case 𝜃    implies that external aid takes the form of loan. Thus, the case 
𝜃    is a proxy of “red light”, and the case 𝜃    is a proxy of “green light” under 
the World Bank’s traffic light system. It is to be noted that the grant aid is not fully 
provided but that it is discounted as ln(  𝜃). This reflects two actual phenomena. 
Firstly, the World Bank’s traffic light system indeed discounts each country’s grant 
allocation by 80%, in order to avoid moral hazard among the recipient countries. This 
discount is supposed to function as an incentive for a “red light” country to improve 
their debt sustainability to become a “green light” country which can receive the 
allocated loan aid without any discount. Secondly, other aid donors than the World 
Bank, especially bilateral aid donors, cannot provide as much grant aid as the World 
Bank can, since they do not have abundant grant resources. Therefore, as the recipient 
country becomes eligible for 100% grant aid, other donors face more difficulties to 
provide full-fledged grant. Thus, even if the recipient country is “red light” (i.e. 𝜃  
 ), its actual grant amount to be received is discounted to 69% of what it should 
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receive if there is no restriction on grant amount.  
The net rate of accumulation of public capital is defined as; 
  ̇          (16) 
where 
    depreciation rate of public capital 
Analogous to the private capital, the gross accumulation of public capital is 
also subject to convex adjustment (installation) costs; 
𝛹 (     )       
  
 
   
   (  
  
 
  
  
) (17) 
To sustain an equilibrium of on-going growth, both new public capital 
investment financed domestically,   ̅ , and the external aid flow,  , must be tied to the 
scale of the economy; 
  ̅  𝜎           𝜎𝐴       𝜎         𝜎𝐴          𝜎  𝜎𝐴     
Therefore, equation (15) can be re-written as; 
  ̇  𝜎   𝜆 𝐴 ln(  𝜃) 𝜎𝐴   𝜆 𝐴 (  𝜃)𝜎𝐴        
  ̇   𝜎  𝜆 𝐴 ln(  𝜃) 𝜎𝐴  𝜆 𝐴(  𝜃)𝜎𝐴        
(18) 
Then, dividing equation (18) by   , the growth rate of public capital is given 
by; 
  ̇
  
≡ 𝜙   𝜎  𝜆 𝐴 ln(  𝜃) 𝜎𝐴  𝜆 𝐴(  𝜃)𝜎𝐴 
 
  
    (19) 
The government faces the following flow budget constraint; 
  ̇  𝛹 (     )   (
 
 
)   𝜏  𝑇   ln(  𝜃)    (  𝜃)   
  ̇  𝛹 (     )   (
 
 
)   𝜏  𝑇   (ln(  𝜃)  (  𝜃)) 
(20) 
where 
    public debt stock 
Equation (20) states that the excess of domestic government expenditure on 
 91 
public capital and interest payments on debt over tax is financed by the tax revenue, 
the external aid, and accumulating public debt. If the external aid takes the form of 
100% loan (i.e. 𝜃   ), a unit increase in the external aid results in equivalent 
increase in public debt and the associated adjustment costs. For simplicity, the loan aid 
is assumed to be provided with no interest rate. To the extent that pubic capital 
investment involves installation costs, which require domestic resources, a unit 
increase in the external aid will actually require the government to issue additional 
public debt to finance the installation component of the investment. This costs get 
even higher when the external aid takes some amount of loan, since the repayment of 
the loan aid also accumulates the public debt. 
In addition, the government satisfy the following intertemporal budget 
constraint; 
li 
 →∞
   
  (
 
 )  (21) 
National debt is the sum of private and public debts (i.e.    𝑃    ). 
Thus, combining equation (6) and (20), the national budget constraint (the nation’s 
current account) is defined as; 
 ̇   ?̇?    ̇  
 ̇  [   (
 
 
) 𝑃  𝛹𝑃( 𝑃  𝑃)  (  𝜏)  𝑇]
 [𝛹 (     )   (
 
 
)   𝜏  𝑇
  (ln(  𝜃)  (  𝜃))] 
 ̇    (
 
 
)    𝛹𝑃( 𝑃  𝑃)  𝛹 (     )   
  (ln(  𝜃)  (  𝜃)) 
 
 
 
(22) 
Equation (22) states that the economy accumulates its national debt to finance 
interest payments, its consumption, and its total investment on private and public 
capital, net of output produced and the net external aid received. 
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3.3. Macroeconomic Equilibrium 
The steady-state equilibrium has the characteristic that all real quantities grow 
at the same constant rate and that the relative price of capital, 𝑞, is constant. Thus, the 
dynamics of the system can be expressed with the stationary variables, normalized by 
the private capital stock ( ≡
 
  
,  ≡
  
  
,  ≡
 
  
) and 𝑞. The equilibrium system 
can be derived as follows. 
Firstly, taking the time derivative of   and substituting (11) and (19) yields; 
 ̇
 
≡ 𝜙  𝜙𝑃 
  ̇
  
  𝜎  𝜆 𝐴 ln(  𝜃) 𝜎𝐴  𝜆 𝐴(  𝜃)𝜎𝐴 
 
  
    [
𝑞   
 𝑃
  𝑃] 
  ̇
  
  𝜎  𝜆 𝐴 ln(  𝜃) 𝜎𝐴  𝜆 𝐴(  𝜃)𝜎𝐴    
𝜂   
𝑞   
 𝑃
 (    𝑃) 
 
 
(23) 
→  ̇   𝜎  𝜆 𝐴 ln(  𝜃) 𝜎𝐴  𝜆 𝐴(  𝜃)𝜎𝐴    
𝜂  
𝑞   
 𝑃
 
 (    𝑃)  
(24) 
Secondly, dividing (22) by national debt stock,  , and substituting, (22) can 
be rewritten as; 
 ̇
 
≡ 𝜙  
 ̇
 
  (
 
   
)
 
 
 
[{ 𝜎  𝜆 𝐴 ln(  𝜃) 𝜎𝐴  𝜆 𝐴(  𝜃)𝜎𝐴 
    𝜎𝐴(ln(  𝜃)  (  𝜃)) }  
𝜂
   
  
 
 𝜎  𝜆 𝐴 ln(  𝜃) 𝜎𝐴  𝜆 𝐴(  𝜃)𝜎𝐴 
   𝜂  
 
(𝑞   )
  𝑃
  ]  
(25) 
Taking the time derivative of   and combining with (11), 
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 ̇
 
≡ 𝜙  𝜙𝑃 
 ̇
 
  (
 
   
)  
 
 
[{ 𝜎  𝜆 𝐴 ln(  𝜃) 𝜎𝐴  𝜆 𝐴(  𝜃)𝜎𝐴 
    𝜎𝐴(ln(  𝜃)  (  𝜃)) }  
𝜂
   
  
 
 𝜎  𝜆 𝐴 ln(  𝜃) 𝜎𝐴  𝜆 𝐴(  𝜃)𝜎𝐴 
   𝜂  
 
(𝑞   )
  𝑃
  ]  
𝑞   
 𝑃
  𝑃 
(26) 
→  ̇   (
 
   
) 
 [{ 𝜎  𝜆 𝐴 ln(  𝜃) 𝜎𝐴  𝜆 𝐴(  𝜃)𝜎𝐴 
    𝜎𝐴(ln(  𝜃)  (  𝜃)) }  
𝜂
   
  
 
 𝜎  𝜆 𝐴 ln(  𝜃) 𝜎𝐴  𝜆 𝐴(  𝜃)𝜎𝐴 
   𝜂  
 
(𝑞   )
  𝑃
  ]  
𝑞   
 𝑃
   𝑃  
(27) 
 
Thirdly, from (9) and (12), the growth rate of consumption is expressed as; 
 ̇
 
≡ 𝜙  
 (
 
   )   
  𝛾
 (28) 
Taking the time derivative of   and combining with (11), 
 ̇
 
≡ 𝜙  𝜙𝑃 
 ̇
 
 
 (
 
   )   
  𝛾
 
𝑞   
 𝑃
  𝑃 
 
(29) 
→  ̇  
 (
 
   )   
  𝛾
  
𝑞   
 𝑃
   𝑃  (30) 
 
Finally, rewriting (13) implies; 
?̇?    (
 
   
) 𝑞  (  𝜏)(   )  𝜂  
(𝑞   ) 
  𝑝
  𝑃𝑞 (31) 
Equation (24), (27), (30) and (31) provide an autonomous set of dynamic 
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equations in  ,  ,   and 𝑞, from which the evolution of public debt can be derived. 
 
3.4. Steady-State Equilibrium 
The economy reaches the steady state when  ̇   ̇   ̇  ?̇?   , implying 
that 
  ̇
  
 
  ̇
  
 
 ̇
 
 
 ̇
 
≡ 𝜙  , the balanced growth rate of the economy. The steady 
state is thus described by; 
 𝜎  𝜆 𝐴 ln(  𝜃) 𝜎𝐴  𝜆 𝐴(  𝜃)𝜎𝐴   (   )
𝜂      
𝑞    
 𝑃
  𝑃 (32) 
   (
   
     
)  
 
   
[{  𝜎 
  (  𝜆 𝐴) ln(  𝜃)  (  𝜆 𝐴)(  𝜃) 𝜎𝐴} (   )
𝜂
   
  
 
 𝜎  𝜆 𝐴 ln(  𝜃) 𝜎𝐴
 𝜆 𝐴(  𝜃)𝜎𝐴 
 (   )
 𝜂   
(𝑞  
   )
  𝑃
  ̅]
 
𝑞    
 𝑃
  𝑃 
(33) 
   (
   
     
)   
  𝛾
 
𝑞    
 𝑃
  𝑃  𝜙   (34) 
    (
   
     
) 𝑞   (  𝜏)(   ) (   )
𝜂  
(𝑞    )
 
  𝑝
  𝑃𝑞     (35) 
These equations determine the steady-state equilibrium in the following recursive 
manner. Firstly, equations (32) – (35) jointly determine    , 𝑞  , and    (
   
     
), 
from which the steady-state growth rate 𝜙   immediately follows. Having 
determined     and    (
   
     
), the equilibrium  stock of debt-capital ratio,    , is 
obtained from (5). Given   , 𝑞  ,    (
   
     
), and    , the equilibrium 
consumption-capital ratio,    , is obtained from the current account equilibrium 
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condition, (30). Provided    (
   
     
)  𝜙   (which is required for the transversality 
condition to hold), higher marginal borrowing costs reduce total interest payments 
raising the consumption-capital ratio. Also, higher installation costs,   , reduce the 
amount of output available for consumption. Because this system is highly non-linear, 
it need not be consistent with a well-defined steady-state equilibrium with      , 
     . However, the subsequent numerical simulations yield well-defined steady-
state values for all plausible specifications of all the structural and policy parameters 
of the model. 
The functional specification of the upward-sloping supply curve to be used is 
the following. Thus, in absence of any borrowing premium, when    , then    ∗, 
the world interest rate. 
   (
   
     
)   ∗   
𝑎 
(   )    (36) 
 
3.5. Equilibrium Dynamics 
Equations (24), (27), (30) and (31) form the dynamics of the system in terms 
of  ,  ,   and 𝑞. Linearizing these equations around the steady-state values leads to 
the following equilibrium dynamics; 
(
 ̇
 ̇
 ̇
?̇?
)   
(
 
 
 
 
𝜕𝑒𝑞(  )
𝜕 
𝜕𝑒𝑞(  )
𝜕 
𝜕𝑒𝑞(  )
𝜕 
𝜕𝑒𝑞(  )
𝜕 
𝜕𝑒𝑞(  )
𝜕𝑐
𝜕𝑒𝑞(  )
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑒𝑞(  )
𝜕𝑐
𝜕𝑒𝑞(  )
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑒𝑞(  )
𝜕 
𝜕𝑒𝑞(  )
𝜕 
𝜕𝑒𝑞(  )
𝜕 
𝜕𝑒𝑞(  )
𝜕 
𝜕𝑒𝑞(  )
𝜕𝑐
𝜕𝑒𝑞(  )
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑒𝑞(  )
𝜕𝑐
𝜕𝑒𝑞(  )
𝜕𝑞 )
 
 
 
 
|
|
  =  ̅̅ ̅̅      = ̅    𝑐=𝑐̅    𝑞=?̅?
 (
     
     
     
𝑞  𝑞  
)  
 
(37) 
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(
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
   
 𝑃
   
   
′ ( )   
     
    ( )  𝜙   
(𝑞      )
 𝑃
 
   
(  𝛾)
   
′ ( )   
(     ) 
 
   
′ ( )   
(     ) 
  (  𝜏)(   ) (   )
𝜂  
   
(  𝛾)
   
′ ( )
(     )
   
′ ( )
(     )
𝑞  
  
   
 𝑃
    ( )  𝜙  
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (
     
     
     
𝑞  𝑞  
)  
where 
      𝜎  𝜆 𝐴 ln(  𝜃) 𝜎𝐴  𝜆 𝐴(  𝜃)𝜎𝐴   (   )
𝜂      𝜙   
      [   
′ ( )
   
 
(   ) 
   𝜎  𝜆 𝐴 ln(  𝜃) 𝜎𝐴  𝜆 𝐴(  𝜃)𝜎𝐴   (   )
𝜂  
 (    )  
  
 
 𝜎  𝜆 𝐴 ln(  𝜃) 𝜎𝐴  𝜆 𝐴(  𝜃)𝜎𝐴 
 (   )
 𝜂  ] 
The determinant of the coefficient matrix of (37) can be shown to be positive 
under the condition that     𝜙   i.e., the steady-state interest rate facing the 
borrowing country must be greater than the steady-state growth rate of the economy. 
Imposing the transeversality condition (14), the above-mentioned condition is indeed 
satisfied. Since (37) is a fourth-order system, a positive determinant implies that there 
could be zero, two or four positive (unstable) roots. Imposing the following 
conditions: (i)  
 
 
 γ   , (ii)   ≤  𝑃, and (iii) 𝑞      , suffices to rule out the 
case of zero and four positive roots. Note that the conditions (i) – (iii) are sufficient for 
saddle-point stability. Thus the dynamic system (37) can be shown to be saddle-point 
stable with two positive (unstable) and two negative (stable) roots, the latter being 
denoted by    and   , with        . The stable solution is of the generic form: 
 ( )      𝐵  
𝜌1  𝐵  
𝜌   (38) 
 ( )      𝐵     
𝜌1  𝐵     
𝜌   (39) 
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 ( )      𝐵     
𝜌1  𝐵     
𝜌   (40) 
𝑞( )  𝑞   𝐵     
𝜌1  𝐵     
𝜌   (41) 
where 𝐵  and 𝐵  are arbitrary constants and the vector (          )
′   
    (where the prime denotes vector transpose) is the normalized eigenvector 
associated with the stable eigenvalue,   . That is, (          )
′ satisfies: 
(
 
 
 
 
 
      
   
  
   
   
 ( )   
     
    ( )  𝜙      
(𝑞      )
  
 
𝑐  
(  𝛾)
   
 ( )   
(     )
 
 
   
 ( )   
(     )
   (  𝜏)(   ) (   )
𝜂  
𝑐  
(  𝛾)
   
 ( )
(     )
   
 ( )
(     )
𝑞  
    
𝑐  
  
    ( )  𝜙     )
 
 
 
 
 
  
 (
 
   
   
 4 
)    (42) 
The arbitrary constants 𝐵  and 𝐵 , appearing in the solutions, (38)-(41), are 
obtained from initial conditions, specifically that the economy starts out with given 
initial stocks of capital and debt    and   . Setting     in (38) and (40) and 
letting     ≡       , and     ≡       , then 𝐵  and 𝐵  are given by: 
𝐵  
            
       
;    𝐵  
            
       
 (43) 
The constants 𝐵  and 𝐵  thus depend on the specific shocks, and once 
determined, the complete solution for the equilibrium evolution follows from (38)-(41).  
 
4. Numerical Analysis of Transitional Paths 
4.1. Permanent Shocks 
Further insights into the effects of aid inflow are obtained from analyzing the 
model numerically. The following numerical simulation is based on calibration of a 
benchmark economy, using the following parameters representative of a small open 
economy which starts out from an equilibrium with zero transfers. The parameter 
values, described in Table 3-2, are conventional and lead to the following plausible 
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benchmark equilibrium reported in row (0) of Table 3-3.  
 
Table 3-2: Parameter Values for Benchmark Economy 
Preference Parameters: 𝛾    .4,    . 4 
Production Parameters:    .4,    . ,  𝑃   5,     5 
Depreciation Rates:  𝑃   . 5,     . 4 
Borrowing Condition:  ∗   . 6,    .  
Policy Parameters: 𝜏   . 5, 𝜎   . 5 
External Aid Parameters: 𝜎𝐴   , 𝜆 𝐴   . , 𝜆 𝐴   .5 
“Traffic Light” Parameters 𝜃    
 
Table 3-3: Steady-State Values for Permanent Shocks 
             𝑞   𝜙      ⁄   𝑃  ⁄    ⁄    ⁄  
(0) Benchmark 
𝜎𝐴   , 
𝜃    
0.2515 0.1057 0.1689 2.0551 2.03% 0.8286 3.2948 0.5565 0.3483 
(1) Red Light 
𝜎𝐴   . 5, 
𝜃    
0.2868 0.1357 0.1792 2.0779 2.19% 0.9205 3.2094 0.5751 0.4355 
(2) Yellow Light 
𝜎𝐴   . 5, 
𝜃   .5 
0.3359 0.1752 0.1653 2.1058 2.37% 1.0445 3.1096 0.5140 0.5448 
(3) Green Light 
𝜎𝐴   . 5, 
𝜃    
0.3792 0.2085 0.1482 2.1275 2.52% 1.1509 3.0351 0.4498 0.6328 
 
From (1) and ( ≡
 
  
,  ≡
  
  
,  ≡
 
  
), the key variables are obtained as: 
  
 
 
 
 ( )𝜂
 (44) 
 𝑃
 
 
 
 ( )𝜂
 (45) 
 
 
 
 
 ( )𝜂
 (46) 
 
 
 
 
 ( )𝜂
 (47) 
The ratio of public-private capital,  , is 0.2515; the public capital-output 
ratio,    ⁄ , is 0.8286; the private capital-output ratio,  𝑃  ⁄ , is 3.2948; the 
consumption-output ratio,   ⁄ , is 0.5565; and the debt-output ratio,   ⁄ , is 0.3483, 
with the equilibrium growth rate, 𝜙  , being 2.03%. This equilibrium is a reasonable 
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characterization of a small medium-indebted developing economy experiencing a 
modest steady rate of growth and having a relatively small stock of public capital. 
Row (1) – (3) summarizes the permanent changes to this equilibrium 
following the aid inflow equal to 5% of the recipient country’s GDP. Row (1) 
describes the permanent effects of “grant” aid inflow. Row (2) describes the 
permanent effects of aid inflow, which is in the form of grant and loan mixture. Row 
(3) describes the permanent effects of “loan” aid inflow. The following analysis is 
based on the conventional assumption that the system starts out from an initial steady-
state equilibrium.  
In the steady state of Row (3), the ratio of public to private capital increases 
from 0.8286 to 1.1509, thereby generating a huge investment boom in infrastructure. 
The increase in the stock of public capital increases the marginal productivity of 
private capital. Although the aid inflow stimulates consumption through the wealth 
effect, the higher long-run productive capacity has a greater effect on output, leading 
to a decline in the long-run consumption – output ratio from 0.5565 to 0.4498. The 
higher productivity raises the long-run growth rate to 2.52%. The increased 
accumulation of both public and private capital lead to a higher demand for external 
borrowing as a means of financing new investment in private capital and the 
installation costs of public capital. This results in an increase in the steady state debt – 
output ratio from 0.3483 to 0.6328. However, this higher debt relative to output is 
sustainable since it is caused by higher investment demand rather than higher 
consumption demand. The long run increase in the economy’s productive capacity (as 
measured by the higher stocks of public and private capital, and output) ensures that 
the higher debt is sustainable.  
While the above parameters represent a plausible small open developing 
economy, some of the results are dependent on the characterization. The results of 
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some sensitivity analysis are summarized in Table 3-4 and Table 3-5.  
 
Table 3-4: Sensitivity to Aid Dependency 
 𝜎𝐴   .   𝜎𝐴   .   
𝜙     ⁄  𝜙     ⁄  
(1) Red Light 
𝜃    
2.07% 0.3663 2.32% 0.5155 
(2) Yellow Light 
𝜃   .5 
2.11% 0.3909 2.64% 0.7119 
(3) Green Light 
𝜃    
2.15% 0.4121 2.87% 0.8650 
 
Table 3-5: Sensitivity to Installation Costs 
  𝑃         𝑃        
𝜙     ⁄  𝜙     ⁄  
(1) Red Light 
𝜃    
0.33% 0.8946 3.80% 0.0996 
(2) Yellow Light 
𝜃   .5 
0.47% 1.0176 4.02% 0.1974 
(3) Green Light 
𝜃    
0.59% 1.1164 4.19% 0.2762 
 
Table 3-4 considers two alternative specifications of benchmark economy, 
corresponding to 𝜎𝐴   .   (less aid dependent economy) and 𝜎𝐴   .   (more aid 
dependent economy). General trend remains same, but more aid dependent economy 
can sustain higher, almost twice as much as, debt level, because all of those larger aid 
inflow is assumed to be productively invested into public capital. Table 3-5 presents 
how the installation costs associated with private and public capital investment,  𝑃 
and   , affect the long-run equilibrium. The country with higher installation costs, 
 𝑃         , can only sustain lower debt – output ratio, at less than 30% of GDP in 
any cases. Higher installation costs reflects the situations which hinders infrastructure 
development, such as less development of infrastructure systems, weak capacity of 
line ministries, internal conflict of the country, fraud, corruption, and so forth, all of 
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which are common characterization in the less developed countries. Therefore, Table 
3-5 indicates that the sustainable debt level is lower for the less developed countries. 
The transitional dynamic paths from the benchmark economy (i.e. “no aid”) 
to “Green Light” economy are depicted in Figure 3-3 through Figure 3-8. Figure 3-3 
through Figure 3-6 illustrates the transition path for the ratio of private capital – output, 
public capital – output, consumption – output, and debt – output, respectively. The 
 𝑃  ⁄  ratio declines and the   ⁄  ratio increases monotonically through time. This is 
because the accumulation of public capital raises the average productivity of private 
capital, while the accumulation of both capital raises the need to borrow from abroad. 
Figure 7 illustrates the stable adjustment locus in     space, including how   and 
  increase almost proportionately during the transition.  
The transitional paths of the growth rates for 𝜙𝑃, 𝜙 , 𝜙 , 𝜙 , and 𝜙  
toward their common long-run growth rate are shown in Figure 8. The stimulus to 
public capital raises its initial growth rate to over 5%, after which it declines 
monotonically. By contrast, private capital adjusts only gradually. The growth rate of 
output initially reaches more than 2.6%, then declines to the long-run growth rate 
2.52%. At first the debt growth rate rises sharply to over 15%, due to the fact that the 
country suddenly receives the aid in the form of loan, but it monotonically declines 
through time. This is because the loan aid inflow promotes accumulation of public 
capital, which raises the average productivity of private capital, while the 
accumulation of both types of capital raises the need to borrow from abroad. However, 
as the marginal productivity of private capital declines over time, the accumulation of 
public and thus private capital slows down, which eventually reduces the growth rate 
of debt.  
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Figure 3-3: Transitional Adjustment  
from “no aid” to “Green Light” 
Private Capital-Output Ratio 
 
Figure 3-4: Transitional Adjustment  
from “no aid” to “Green Light” 
Public Capital-Output Ratio 
 
Figure 3-5: Transitional Adjustment  
from “no aid” to “Green Light” 
Consumption-Output Ratio 
 
Figure 3-6: Transitional Adjustment  
from “no aid” to “Green Light” 
Debt-Output Ratio 
 
Figure 3-7: Transitional Adjustment  
from “no aid” to “Green Light” 
Transitional Adjustment Locus 
 
Figure 3-8: Transitional Adjustment  
from “no aid” to “Green Light” 
Growth Rates 
 
The transitional dynamic paths from “Green Light” economy to “Red Light” 
economy are depicted in Figure 3-9 through Figure 3-14.  
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Figure 3-9: Transitional Adjustment  
from “Green Light” to “Red Light” 
Private Capital-Output Ratio 
 
Figure 3-10: Transitional Adjustment  
from “Green Light” to “Red Light” 
Public Capital-Output Ratio 
 
Figure 3-11: Transitional Adjustment  
from “Green Light” to “Red Light” 
Consumption-Output Ratio 
 
Figure 3-12: Transitional Adjustment  
from “Green Light” to “Red Light” 
Debt-Output Ratio 
 
Figure 3-13: Transitional Adjustment  
from “Green Light” to “Red Light” 
Transitional Adjustment Locus 
 
Figure 3-14: Transitional Adjustment  
from “Green Light” to “Red Light” 
Growth Rates 
 
In the new steady state under “Red Light”, the ratio of public to private 
capital decreases from 0.3792 to 0.2868, which leads to lower marginal productivity of 
3.0000
3.0500
3.1000
3.1500
3.2000
3.2500
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
5
0
6
0
7
0
8
0
9
0
1
0
0
0.9000
0.9500
1.0000
1.0500
1.1000
1.1500
1.2000
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
5
0
6
0
7
0
8
0
9
0
1
0
0
0.4000
0.4500
0.5000
0.5500
0.6000
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
5
0
6
0
7
0
8
0
9
0
1
0
0
0.4000
0.4500
0.5000
0.5500
0.6000
0.6500
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
5
0
6
0
7
0
8
0
9
0
1
0
0
0.1250
0.1450
0.1650
0.1850
0.2050
0.2250
0.2500 0.3000 0.3500 0.4000
0.0040
0.0060
0.0080
0.0100
0.0120
0.0140
0.0160
0.0180
0.0200
0.0220
0.0240
0.0260
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
5
0
6
0
7
0
8
0
9
0
1
0
0
φP 
φG 
φC 
φD 
φY 
 𝑃  ⁄  
t 
new steady-state 
original steady-state 
t 
original steady-state 
new steady-state 
  ⁄  
   ⁄  
t 
new steady-state 
original steady-state 
t 
original steady-state 
new steady-state 
  ⁄  
  
  t 
 104 
private capital. The decreased accumulation of both public and private capital lead to a 
lower demand for external borrowing as a means of financing new investment in 
private capital and the installation costs of public capital. This results in decrease in 
the steady state debt – output ratio from 0.6328 to 0.4355. However, the lower 
productivity decreases the long-run growth rate to 2.19%. Figure 3-9 through Figure 
3-12 illustrates the transition path for the ratio of private capital – output, public 
capital – output, consumption – output, and debt – output, respectively. As opposed to 
Figure 3-3 through Figure 3-6, the  𝑃  ⁄  ratio increases and the   ⁄  ratio declines 
monotonically through time. This is because the decrease of public capital lowers the 
average productivity of private capital, while decrease of both capital lowers the need 
to borrow from abroad. Figure 3-13 illustrates the stable adjustment locus in     
space, including how   and   decrease over time.  
The transitional growth rates are depicted in Figure 3-14. The growth rate of 
debt plunges to less than 0.5%, because the aid takes the form of grant instead of loan. 
Over time, as the marginal productivity of private capital improves, the need for 
external borrowing raises the growth rate of debt to the long-run sustainable rate, 
although the debt – output ratio declines monotonically.  
 
4.2. Temporary Shocks 
While analyses in 4.1. explore the permanent effect of grant/loan aid inflow, 
the realty which the recipient countries are faced up with is volatile aid modality 
changes. In other words, “traffic light” turns to “red” for several periods then returns 
to “green”, for instance. Under such situations, a recipient country’s transitional path 
toward steady state becomes more complicated than that of the permanent shocks. 
This section assumes that “traffic light” for recipient country is initially 
“green”, but turns into “red” for the five periods, then returns to “green”. The 
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transitional dynamic paths are depicted in Figure 3-15 through Figure 3-20.  
 
 
Figure 3-15: Transitional Adjustment  
from “Green Light” to “Red Light” 
then to “Green Light” 
Private Capital-Output Ratio 
 
Figure 3-16: Transitional Adjustment  
from “Green Light” to “Red Light” 
then to “Green Light”Public 
Capital-Output Ratio 
 
Figure 3-17: Transitional Adjustment  
from “Green Light” to “Red Light” 
then to “Green Light” 
Consumption-Output Ratio 
 
Figure 3-18: Transitional Adjustment  
from “Green Light” to “Red Light” 
then to “Green Light” 
Debt-Output Ratio 
 
Figure 3-19: Transitional Adjustment  
from “Green Light” to “Red Light” 
then to “Green Light” 
Transitional Adjustment Locus 
 
Figure 3-20: Transitional Adjustment  
from “Green Light” to “Red Light” 
then to “Green Light” 
Growth Rates 
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In contrast to the permanent shocks depicted in previous section, the 
adjustments are characterized by reversal transitional dynamics. Suppose that the 
economy starts out from the equilibrium point A in Figure 3-19. During the period of 
“Red Light”, the grant aid inflow reduces the debt and public capital investment, 
which is represented by the moving along the locus AB. Once the “traffic light” 
changes back to “Green Light”, the inflow of loan aid, which is more inclined to be 
invested into public capital than the grant aid, raises the public capital stock by 
increasing the debt. Thus, the economy starts increasing the debt and public capital 
along the locus BCA. 
Figure 3-15 through 3-18 illustrate the dynamic time paths for the ratio of 
private capital – output, public capita – output, consumption – output, debt – output 
ratios, respectively. These all show the reversal transition from “Red Light” period to 
“Green Light” period.  
Figure 3-20 illustrates the growth rates. After the five periods of receiving 
grant aid during “Red Light”, the growth rates increases abruptly back to the higher 
equilibrium level. Its volatility seems harmful to the country’s economy. 
 
5. Policy Implications and Way Forward 
This paper addresses the macroeconomic impact of the traffic light system. 
There are three main policy implications derived. 
Firstly, the numerical analyses indicate the possibility that the current 
thresholds for external borrowing under the traffic light system could be sub-optimal 
for some countries with high potential to achieve economic growth by utilizing debt-
financed investment. This is represented by the steady-state value of debt – output 
ratio, namely 0.4355 for “Red Light”, 0.5448 for “Yellow Light”, and 0.6328 for 
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“Green Light”, all of which is larger than the thresholds under the traffic light system. 
For instance, under the traffic light system, debt – GDP threshold for the country with 
strong policy is set at 50%, and therefore the country’s “traffic light” may be classified 
as “Red” if the country’s debt level exceeds 50%. On the other hand, the numerical 
analyses show that the steady-state value of debt – output ratio for “Green Light” is 
63.28%, and thus it indicates that the country can sustainably utilize external 
borrowing beyond the current “50%” threshold. Therefore, the traffic light system 
might be unduly constraining the ability of developing countries to finance their 
development goals, and thus the system needs to be reviewed in terms of validating 
feasibility of the thresholds. Desirably, the debt thresholds should be calibrated, based 
on country specific characteristics. For instance, threshold for the country with high 
potentiality to grow further and the country moving toward its growth ceiling should 
be different, even if both countries’ debt burden indicators are at same level. Use of 
country-specific information is explored in IMF and the World Bank (2012), which 
states that IMF and the World Bank would utilize the use of judgment based on 
country specific information when assessing the risk of debt distress instead of setting 
country specific thresholds at this moment, but that country specific thresholds based 
on default probability could be incorporated in future if it approves useful.  
Secondly, transient traffic light forces the developing countries into a difficult 
macroeconomic management, since they need to adjust frequently capital investment 
policy before the productive capacity of public capital is achieved, since capital 
investment takes time to be materialized, as indicated in the transitional paths. 
Therefore, the traffic light system should be refined in terms of securing stability. 
Volatility is one of the inevitable aspects of the traffic light system, since it is designed, 
based on both thresholds of CPIA scores and the debt burden indicators, which result 
in threshold effect. Namely, small changes around the thresholds can lead to discrete 
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jumps in the traffic light, such as “green” to “red” in some extreme cases. 
Alternatively, the countries with significantly different level of CPIA or the debt could 
be classified into the same traffic light category. In this case, the risk of debt distress 
may be over-estimated for the countries with “better” CPIA score or the debt level, 
and may be under-estimated for the countries with “worse” CPIA score or the debt 
level. A s long as the traffic light system is “operational framework”, such kind of 
volatility cannot be removed systematically. Therefore, it will all come down to how 
the judgment by IMF and the World Bank staff can alleviate threshold effect. What 
IMF and the World Bank can do is to develop and provide ex-ante guidance which 
illustrate how the country specific information is taken into consideration in 
determining the traffic light.  
Thirdly, higher installation costs of capital investment reduces the sustainable 
debt – output ratio. Those bottlenecks of the developing countries typically stem not 
from the specific sectors but from the overall system, such as economic management, 
cost of doing business, and governance structures. Therefore, the external aid needs to 
take the comprehensive approach, which eventually enhances the country’s debt 
absorptive capacity. 
There are three possible directions to move the research further in future.  
Firstly, since the model constructed in this paper treats the traffic light and the 
volume of aid inflow as given, the natural extension is to endogenize those variables. 
Namely, future model should be constructed to analyze how the economy reaches to 
the long-run equilibrium while receiving grant aid when the debt level is within the 
defined threshold and receiving loan aid when the debt exceeds the limit. Another 
assumption to be relaxed is that the aid volume is not necessarily proportional to the 
GDP of the developing country. Practically, after reaching some economic level, the 
developing country receives less aid toward its graduation from aid recipients status. 
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Therefore, the assumption behind the current model is justifiable when considering the 
low income countries, but it may not be applicable to the middle income countries. 
One of the potential difficulties of this direction is that it is uncertain whether there 
exist a steady-state solution, because the traffic light system and income categories 
casts a discontinuous constraint on external borrowing in the model. 
Secondly, the model constructed in this paper focuses on the effects of the 
traffic light on the economic performance of small open developing economy, based 
on the assumption that there is no feedback effect from such economy to donor 
economies. However, the traffic light simultaneously affects number of developing 
economies, and thus the collective feedback effects on the donor economies may no 
longer be negligible, especially in a sense that the growing demand for grant aid, 
instead of loan aid, may worsen the financial difficulties of international aid budget in 
donor economies. Hence, a natural extension of this analysis is to consider the aid in a 
multi-country growth equilibrium setting. 
Thirdly, the model explored in this paper does not take stochasticity into 
consideration. The current model assumes that the public capital enhances productivity 
of the private capital in deterministic manner, but there should be an unmanageable 
productivity shock, such as poor performance of public infrastructures, unreasonable 
weather, natural disaster, financial crisis of other countries, and so forth. For instance, 
floods hit the Thailand’s economy in 2011, and the blackout of electricity occurred in 
July 2012 in India affected seriously the private sector’s economic activities. Thus, 
stochastic productivity shock is indispensable factor in analyzing the developing 
countries economy.  
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